What Property Is by Bell, Abraham & Parchomovsky, Gideon
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2-1-2004 
What Property Is 
Abraham Bell 
Bar-Ilan University 
Gideon Parchomovsky 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Repository Citation 
Bell, Abraham and Parchomovsky, Gideon, "What Property Is" (2004). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 9. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
University of Pennsylvania Law School 
ILE 
INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND ECONOMICS 
 
A Joint Research Center of the Law School, the Wharton School, 
and the Department of Economics in the School of Arts and Sciences 
at the University of Pennsylvania 
________________________________________ 
 
 
 
RESEARCH PAPER NO. 04-05 
 
WHAT PROPERTY IS 
 
 
 
ABRAHAM BELL 
Fordham University Law School 
Bar Ilan University Faculty of Law 
 
GIDEON PARCHOMOVSKY 
University of Pennsylvania Law School 
 
 
 
February 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the 
Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=509862
 
1 
WHAT PROPERTY IS 
Abraham Bell∗ and Gideon Parchomovsky∗∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Property law has eluded both a consistent definition and 
a unified conceptual framework.  Instrumentalists insist that 
property is nothing more than default contract rules.  
Conceptualists proclaim the primacy of in rem 
conceptualization and of specially privileged rights such as 
the rights to exclude.  Others think of property as an 
infinitely malleable “bundle of sticks.” 
We demonstrate that any comprehensive property theory 
must address four legal questions:  (1) What things are 
protected by property law; (2) vis-à-vis whom; (3) with what 
rights; and (4) enforced by what mechanism.  Then, we 
introduce a value-oriented theory to show how property law 
answers these questions by recognizing and helping to create 
stable relationships between persons and assets, allowing 
owners to extract otherwise unavailable utility. 
Our approach illuminates recent property developments, 
and demonstrates the need for reform.  Additionally, we 
demonstrate the need for property occasionally to yield to 
other legal fields like  secured transactions. 
 
∗ Visiting Associate Professor, Fordham University Law School; Lecturer, Bar Ilan 
University Faculty of Law. 
∗∗ Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  This Article greatly 
benefited from comments and criticisms by Oren Bar-Gill, Susan Block-Lieb, Bob 
Ellickson, Abner Greene, Assaf Hamdani, Eugene Kontorovich, Brian Lenhard, Jide 
Nzelibe, Russell Pearce, Eduardo Penalver, Dan Richman, Chris Serkin, Peter 
Siegelman, Henry Smith, Linda Sugin, Steve Thel, Bill Treanor, Ben Zipursky, and 
participants in the Fordham University Law School Faculty Workshop.  Peter Huh, 
Sean McEldowney, Drew Norman and Kara Siegel provided outstanding research 
assistance. 
 
© Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, 2004 
   WHAT PROPERTY IS 2 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Abstract ................................................................................................1 
Introduction..........................................................................................3 
I. The Theory of Property ..........................................................10 
A. A Natural Right to Property ......................................................10 
B. Positivism and Conceptualism ..................................................12 
C. Utilitarianism ............................................................................16 
D. Relational Conceptions of Property ..........................................19 
E. Neo-conceptualism and Utilitarianism .....................................20 
II. A Unified Value Approach to Property ..................................20 
A. Overview: Property and Stability..............................................21 
B. Value of Property to an Owner .................................................22 
C. Value of Property to Society......................................................27 
D. Asset Definition .........................................................................32 
E. Property and Contract ..............................................................35 
III. Through The Value Prism ......................................................35 
A. Labor Theory of Value ..............................................................36 
B. Value and Personhood ..............................................................36 
C. Value and Economic Property ..................................................39 
D. Value and Information Theory ..................................................42 
IV. Reordering Property ..............................................................44 
A. Which Assets..............................................................................45 
B. Vis-à-vis Whom .........................................................................47 
C. Which Rights .............................................................................53 
D. What Enforcement .....................................................................57 
V. Understanding Property With the Value Theory....................59 
A. Possession .................................................................................59 
B. Chain of Title.............................................................................64 
C. Exclusion ...................................................................................65 
D. Co-Tenancies.............................................................................69 
VI. Revising Property With the Value Theory..............................70 
A. Nuisance ....................................................................................70 
B. Takings ......................................................................................71 
VII. The Boundaries of Property ...................................................76 
A. Bankruptcy, Mortgages and Sureties ........................................76 
B. Marital Property .......................................................................79 
C. Property vs. Property Conflicts: Leaseholds ............................80 
Conclusion..........................................................................................83 
 
   WHAT PROPERTY IS 3 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Property is important.  Believed by some to be a keystone right,1 
or even the core of liberty,2 property lies at the foundation of both 
contract and tort law.  As a legal term, property is prominent in many 
doctrines and statutes.  Importantly, by contrast to contractual rights 
that avail only against other parties to the agreement, property rights 
avail against the rest of the world irrespective of consent.  Hence, 
classifying an interest as property has far reaching implications in our 
legal system.  A simple example demonstrates the power and 
importance of property.  Consider the conveyance of an automobile.  
A contract can suffice to allocate legal rights between Buyer and 
Seller and, as between them, can render property law redundant.  
However, Buyer and Seller have no contractual relationship with third 
parties who may covet the automobile.  Here, as between people out 
of contractual reach from one another, property is dominant.  Since it 
is practically impossible to arrange most relationships in society by 
mutual agreement, property law determines most of the legal 
interactions regarding assets among people. 
Yet, property law often seems to suffer from a characteristic 
disease of legal categories; everyone knows what it is, but no one can 
define it.3  Despite the recent renaissance of property as a subject of 
academic inquiry,4 the field seems to be in insoluble theoretic 
 
1 See Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329 
(1999) (reviewing and critically examining the various sources of the view of 
property as a keystone right). 
2 See WALTER LIPPMANN, THE METHOD OF FREEDOM, 100-02 (1934) ("[T]he only 
dependable foundation of personal liberty is the personal economic security of 
private property."); MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, 7-21 (1962) 
(arguing that private property is necessary for individual and political freedom); 
Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771 (1964) (positing that 
“civil liberties must have a basis in property, or bills of rights will not preserve 
them”). 
3 See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (After 
empathizing with “the Court, which ... was faced with the task of trying to define 
what may be indefinable,” Justice Stewart wrote of “hard-core pornography” and 
the case at hand, “I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I 
understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could 
never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it....”). 
4 A number of recent articles have been distinguished by their excellence and the 
importance of their contributions to the revival of property.  See e.g., Henry E. 
Smith, The Language of Property :Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
1105 (2003): Symposium, The Evolution Of Property Rights, 31 J. LEG. STUD. 331 
(2002); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law 
of Property: The Numerus Clausus Princple, 110 YALE L.J. 1  (2001) (hereinafter, 
“Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus”); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The 
Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001) (hereinafter, “Merrill 
& Smith, Property/Contract Interface”); Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of 
Private Property, 109 YALE. L. J. 1163 (1999); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of 
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disarray, with scholars scrambling to assemble a giant puzzle whose 
pieces do not fit.  New theories tend toward the extremes of either 
denying that there is any meaning to property at all,5 or towards the 
magic of formalism,6 and both proclaim loudly – either proudly or 
shamefacedly – the complete disconnect with popular conceptions of 
what property is and why it should be protected.7 
Nowhere is the disjointedness of property theory more manifest  
than in the gap between the two leading methodological approaches to 
property analysis—instrumentalism, represented in the main, by law 
and economics,8 and formalism, or conceptualist scholarship.9 The 
two approaches seem so incompatible with one another that scholars 
belonging to each of the vying camps accuse their counterparts of 
misunderstanding the topic of their study.10   
Law and economics scholars are pleased to eschew altogether any 
special meaning for property, viewing it as an aggregation of legal 
rights (or, in the common metaphor, a “bundle of sticks”) not different 
in kind than legal rights that might be aggregated under any other 
 
the Anti-Commons: Property in Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 621 (1998) (hereinafter, “Heller, Anti-Commons”); Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, 
The Objectivity of Well-Being and the Objectives of Property, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1669 (2003); Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1517 (2003). 
5  See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. 
REV. 1044, 1086 (1984) ("[P]roperty is simply a label for whatever 'bundle of sticks' 
the individual has been granted."); Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, 
XXII NOMOS: PROPERTY 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman, eds. 1980).  
Cf. Adam Mossoff,, What is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 371, 374 (2003)  (“As with any bundle of items--say a shopping bag of 
fruit, filled with oranges, apples, bananas and peaches--people are free to pack it 
and rearrange it in whatever way they see fit.”). 
6 See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, Property/Contract Interface, supra note 4 and Merrill 
& Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 4 (seeking to revive importance of 
traditional formal elements of property).  Merrill and Smith, as we discuss in the 
text, also move far beyond formalism in advancing an informational theory of 
property. 
7 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 113-
15 (1977); JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 1-2 (2000); 
Grey, supra note 4 (comparing the popular understanding of property as thing-
ownership to the bundle of rights conception); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. 
Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L. J. 357 
(2001) (hereinafter, “Merrill & Smith, What Happened to Property”) (noting that 
“[a]lthough people are as concerned as ever with acquiring and defending their 
material possessions, in the academic world there is little interest in understanding 
property.”). 
8 For discussion, see Part I.C., infra.  
9 For discussion, see Part I. D., infra. 
10 See e.g., Merrill & Smith, What Happened to Property, supra note 7 at 358 
(accusing law and economics scholars of not taking property seriously). 
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legal category.11  At the basis of many economic treatments lies a 
Coasian approach.  This approach calls for well-defined legal rights to 
be assigned and then allocated through voluntary exchanges mediated 
by the law of contracts.  In Coase’s view, property rights are simply 
background rules — legally created entitlements awaiting reallocation 
through contract.12  And although Coase himself acknowledged that 
the initial rights allocation could affect the efficiency of an economic 
system,13 most subsequent economic theorists have declined to 
elaborate on this point, choosing instead to devote their attention to 
contractual institutions that succeed the allocation of property rights.14  
Consequently, law and economics scholars do not attach any 
importance to property as a distinct field of law; for purposes of the 
standard economic analysis, property might just as well be the part of 
contract law that specifies default rules. 
The conceptualists counter with notions derived from Roman 
law, insisting on the primacy of in rem rights and specially privileged 
rights such as the rights to exclude, to use and to transfer.15  Some 
conceptualists advance instrumental reasons for certain ancient rules, 
but they fail, or do not bother, to explain the institution of property in 
its entirety.  The instrumentalists, on the other hand, have been able to 
explain some kinds of enforcement rules and property characteristics, 
but have little explanation – and, frankly, little use – for the 
aggregation of ancient forms that define the law of property.16  Off to 
the side, scholars occasionally note that neither head of theory 
connects very well with the popular conceptions of what property is, 
 
11 See, e.g., GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING 
VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970 319-23, 381-82 
(1997); JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 86 (3d. ed. 1993); 
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 2 
(1995); NANCIE G. MARZULLA & ROGER J. MARZULLA, PROPERTY RIGHTS: 
UNDERSTANDING GOVERNMENT TAKINGS AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 11-
12 (1997); EDWARD H. RABIN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN PROPERTY LAW 
1, 22 (4th ed. 2000); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 2 
(2000); John Edward Cribbet, Concepts in Transition: The Search for a New 
Definition of Property, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1; J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” 
Picture of Property, 43 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 711 (1996); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix 
Nix Bundle-o-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the Disaggregation of Property, 93 MICH. 
L. REV. 239 (1994); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth 
Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 
325, 357-67 (1980). 
12 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 8 (1960). 
13 Id. at 16 (noting that in a world with positive transaction costs “the initial 
delimitation of legal rights does have an effect on the efficiency with which the 
economic system operates.”). 
14 For detailed discussion, see Part I.C, infra. 
15 See e.g., A.M. Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107 
(A.G. Guest, ed. 1961).  For a detailed discussion of his work, see Part I.B, infra. 
16 See Part I.C., infra.  
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and why it is valuable,17 but the critics have been not been able to 
create a theory to compete with either the instrumentalists or the 
conceptualists. 
Remarkably, what some might consider the central feature of 
property – its function as a device for capturing and retaining certain 
kinds of value – is almost completely absent from modern conceptual 
discussions of property.18  It was not always so.  In earlier centuries, 
theories of property were almost completely dominated by the issue 
of value: how it was created and to whom it properly belonged, and 
how property helped to capture the value and retain it for its rightful 
(or wrongful) owner.  John Locke, for example, in his Second 
Treatise of Government, suggested that the source of added value was 
labor, and that the addition of labor to natural resources, including the 
labor of finding the resource, created property that naturally belonged 
to the laborer.19  Karl Marx agreed with and extended the labor theory 
of value, arguing that recognizing property rights in capitalists was a 
way of alienating value from its “true” owners – the workers.20 
As these earlier conceptions of value have faded away, however, 
so have their importance to property theory.  In modern economics, 
value is created not by any intrinsic worth of inputs (such as labor); 
rather, value is created by relative tastes and scarcity of resources, 
while profit is created by arbitrage, relying on differences in taste, 
information, or nearly any other factor.21  Thus, it is believed today, 
the institution of property is not necessary to guarantee the “real 
value” of an item for its “true” owner.22  Yet, this logic is flawed.  
 
17 See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 
(1982) (arguing that the personhood theory of property – that some control over 
resources in a person’s external environment is necessary to proper self-
development – is often implicit in court opinions and commentaries, yet ignored in 
legal thought); Meir Dan-Cohen, The Value of Ownership, 1 GLOBAL JURIST 
FRONTIERS (Issue 2, Art. 4 2001), available at 
http://www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/vol1/iss2/art4. 
18 See Part I, infra. 
19 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, Chapter V, Part 26 (1690) 
(reasoning that “every man has a ‘property’ in his own ‘person.’ . . .The ‘labour’ of 
his body and the ‘work’ of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever, 
then, he removes out of the state that Nature hath provided and left it in, he hath 
mixed his labour with it, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby 
makes it his property.”). 
20 KARL MARX, CAPITAL 1-99 (David McLellan ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1995) 
(1867). 
21 See ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776), Book I, Ch. 4 (examing value as 
a function of utility, scarcity, taste and transferability). 
22 See id., Book I, Ch. V, at 51 (“The labourer is rich or poor, is well or ill rewarded, 
in proportion to the real, not to the nominal price of his labour.”).  As Adam Smith 
observed, “[w]hat everything is really worth to the man who has acquired it, and 
who wants to dispose of it or exchange it for something else, is the toil and trouble 
which it can save to himself, and which it can impose upon other people.”  Id. at 47  
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The modern view that value derives from subjective tastes, rather than 
objective reality, does not alter the fact that property is an institution 
uniquely qualified to protect certain kinds of value.  Thus, even in a 
world where value is contingent, rather than absolute, value remains 
the conceptual lynchpin of property theory. 
To eliminate possible confusion, it is important to clarify at the 
outset that for us value is synonymous with utility or welfare as used 
in the field of welfare economics.23  Hence, our account belongs in 
the instrumentalist tradition.  We depart from previous law and 
economics scholarship, however, in that we seek to evaluate the 
utility of property as a discrete legal field, and unearth its defining 
characteristics.  Instead of viewing property doctrines as an aspect of 
contract — the rules that govern not-fully specified contracts — we 
see property as a legal field that stands on its own and serves its own 
goals.  In other words, we argue that property as a field creates utility 
not provided by other fields like contract, just as previous scholars, 
for example, have argued that criminal law as a field creates utility 
not provided by fields like tort.24  The framework we develop 
explains why formal features of property beloved of property 
conceptualists are indispensable to a proper instrumentalist 
understanding of property.  Simultaneously, to the conceptualists, we 
show that even in the muddled world of modern property theory, 
value must be seen as the central concept uniting the law of property. 
Our account is predicated on the insight that property law as a 
legal institution is organized around creating and defending the value 
that inheres in stable ownership.  Property law both recognizes and 
helps constitute stable relationships between persons and assets,25 
 
Thus, according to Smith, “real value” is the “the value of a certain quantity of 
labour which we exchange for what is supposed at the time to contain the value of 
an equal quantity.”  Id. at 48.  “Nominal value,” on the other hand, is the quantity of 
money paid for a good.  Id.  51. 
23 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 961 (2001) (defining welfare economics as “the method of policy assessment 
that depends solely on individuals' well-being” and noting that the welfare 
economics “conception of individuals' well-being is a comprehensive one. It 
recognizes not only individuals' levels of material comfort, but also their degree of 
aesthetic fulfillment, their feelings for others, and anything else that they might 
value, however intangible”). 
24 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful Mean “Criminal”?:  Reflections 
on the Disapearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 193, 
193-94 (1991) (“[T]he factor that most distinguishes the criminal law is its 
operation as a system of moral education and socialization. . . . Far more than tort 
law, [which focuses on compensating victims,] the criminal law is a system for 
public communication of values.”); cf. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 
(1990) (providing survey results suggesting that people obey the criminal law 
because of its moral legitimacy, rather than its deterrent threat). 
25 For detailed discussion, see Part I.B, infra. 
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allowing owners to extract utility that would not, otherwise, be 
available. Adopting this focus enables us to recast many of the key 
insights of the extant property literature, and demonstrate that they 
may be forged into a coherent theory of property.  
As a first step, we analyze the seemingly chaotic body of property 
literature, and distill the foundational questions a comprehensive 
property theory must address.  We posit that contemporary 
scholarship may be clustered around four questions:  First, which 
legal entitlements qualify for legal recognition as property rights?  
Second, against whom do the rights apply?  Third, what is the content 
of property rights, i.e., what kinds of rights does the legal category of 
property bestow upon the owner?  And fourth, and finally, what 
should be the remedies for infringements of property rights? 
Curiously, property scholars have shied away from proffering 
theories that address these four questions as a whole, and have elected 
instead to engage in discrete analyses that center on one or several of 
these themes.  At the risk of a mild over-generalization, it may be said 
that law and economics scholars, have limited their investigations to 
the question of protection, while conceptualist theorists have focused 
their endeavors on the three other questions.  Yet, even the 
conceptualists have not sought to structure property theory around a 
single principle.  For example, Radin has devoted her attention 
primarily to the first question,26 while Merrill and Smith have directed 
their interest at the second,27 and Honore has elected to explore the 
third.28  Worse yet, the discrete analyses of each of the questions have 
been conducted from varying, and often, inconsistent perspectives.   
This Article, on the other hand, focuses not on a discrete question 
but on a common concept.  We postulate that the value inherent in 
stable ownership plays an unheralded but key role in answering all 
four questions, rendering a desperately confused field coherent.  
 
26 See Radin, supra note 17 (proposing a Hegelian notion of personal property as 
imbuing the owner with greater property rights than fungible property); Margaret 
Jane Radin, What, if Anything, Is Wrong With Baby Selling?, 26 PAC. L. J. 135 
(1995) (exploring the legal ramifications of surrogacy, beginning with the issue of 
babies as property); Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 
DUKE L. J. 56, 72 (1993) (noting the challenge in determining tort compensation for 
pain and suffering, solace and other market-less elements of damages); Radin, The 
Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 1667 (1988) (exploring the liberal conception of property and its 
presence in our constitution). 
27 Merrill & Smith, What Happened to Property, supra note 7; Merrill & Smith, 
Property/Contract Interface, supra note 4 (attempting to delineate property law and 
contract law by contrasting the in rem and in personam rights protected by each 
branch, respectively); Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 4 (contending 
that courts should maintain limits upon the exercise of property rights for the sake of 
efficiency). 
28 Honore, supra note 15. 
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Furthermore, we demonstrate that the classic incidents of property are 
subordinate to the overriding goal of defending value, and therefore 
must sometimes be abridged in favor of a rule that protects value.  
Consequently, the theoretical framework we propose extends to many 
of the satellite concepts that have attended recent property scholarship 
such as legal restrictions on the rights to exclude and alienate in order 
to prevent the over-fragmentation of property.29  
Theoretical coherence is by no means the only virtue of our 
analysis. An important result of our theory is the abolition of the 
universally accepted but rarely understood characterization of 
property as a bundle of rights.  In our view, property is a mechanism 
that defends stable ownership value; thus, the various rights that 
attend property are best seen not as random sticks but, rather, as 
means to property’s end.  We demonstrate that a focus on stable 
ownership value is necessary to resolve the puzzle left open by Coase 
of how to arrange legal entitlements in order to maximize economic 
efficiency.  By our lights, the realm of contracts is much smaller than 
assumed by standard analyses, and a law of property based on stable 
ownership value is thus essential to assuring the maximization of 
social welfare. 
In addition to its conceptual implications, our value-oriented 
theory of property has both descriptive and normative power.  
Descriptively, we posit that the modern trend toward reducing the 
rights of non-owner possessors in fields such as the law of find30 aims 
to protect the value of the stable ownership of the original owner.  
Similarly, the value theory sheds new light on the primacy of the right 
to exclude in property law.  Exclusion preserves owners’ idiosyncratic 
values and bargaining position. Hence, it is fitting to allow, as current 
law does, harsh punishment for ostensibly trivial trespass.31  We also 
explain the logic behind various partition rules, and some of the 
complexities of property rules of possession and chain of title. 
Normatively, our value-oriented theory of property demonstrates 
the need for reform in a number of different areas.  For instance, the 
value theory suggests that current nuisance law offers incomplete 
protection to property owners.  Current law protects only the owners’ 
right to the “use and enjoyment” of their property, unfettered by 
unreasonable interference from their neighbors; a reformulated law of 
 
29 Following Michael Heller’s influential article the problem of over-fragmentation 
is often referred to in the literature as “anti-commons.”  Heller, Anti-Commons, 
supra note 4. 
30 See Part V.A, infra. 
31 See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, 563 N.W.2d 154 (1997) (court upholds 
award of $100,000 in punitive damages against the defendant for delivering a 
mobile home over the plaintiff’s property, notwithstanding the absence of “real” 
damages). 
   WHAT PROPERTY IS 10 
 
nuisance would also protect the owners’ right to value.  Another area 
of law ripe for rethinking under a value theory of property is the ever 
controversial subject of takings.  The value theory provides an 
explanation for the Fifth Amendment’s exclusive focus on property in 
takings protection; however, it challenges the current understanding 
of just compensation as payment of market value since this measure 
misses the very element that justifies extra protection of property. 
Finally, we extend our theory to the outer boundaries of property 
by examining situations in which other welfare considerations may 
limit the usefulness of property.  In such boundary situations, we 
argue, protection of stable ownership may bow partially, or 
completely, to the needs of such other fields as contract or secured 
transactions.  Here, again, the key is the importance of stable 
ownership value; as such value declines in magnitude, property law is 
removed from the picture, and legal disputes can and should be 
resolved by means of other legal tools.  Among the fields we analyze 
in this framework are secured transactions and marital property. 
We develop our value theory of property as follows.  In Part I, we 
review the extant theoretical property literature.  In Part II, we 
identify the core function of property law as creating and defending 
the value that inheres in stable ownership of property.  This allows us 
to reevaluate property scholarship in Part III, and examine where it 
succeeds and fails in explaining the design of the legal field of 
property.  In Part IV, we delineate the contours of property by crafting 
a four-step analysis.  Using this new analysis, we demonstrate that the 
value theory provides a comprehensive framework for understanding 
property.  Part V explores ways in which our new concept of property 
illuminates current areas of law.  Part VI highlights principles and 
doctrines that need to be revised in light of our new framework.  Part 
VII examines the boundary questions of property.  A brief conclusion 
follows. 
I. THE THEORY OF PROPERTY 
We begin our foray into the thicket of property theory by 
describing some of the prominent past approaches to property.  Our 
aim in this Part is to produce a rough grouping of various theories of 
property, in order to advance our analysis of the strengths and 
weaknesses of these theories, and enable a reordering of the 
theoretical approach in the next two Parts. 
A. A Natural Right to Property 
Aristotle conceived of the right to property as inherent in the 
moral order.  Arguing against Plato’s preference for common 
property, Aristotle urged for the primacy of private property on the 
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grounds that it encourages people to attend to their own affairs and 
not unduly interfere in those of others.  Aristotle held this incentive to 
be the result of a self-love implanted by nature, such that only respect 
for private property could encourage the important virtue of liberality 
in the matter of property.32  Interestingly, Aristotle viewed the right to 
exclude as a key component of property rights since it allowed owners 
to display virtue by waiving this right and sharing the benefits of 
property ownership with others.33 
In this tradition, early post-Enlightenment theories of property 
focused on a “natural” right to property.  Perhaps the most famous of 
these theories is “the labor theory” associated with John Locke.  
Locke’s point of departure was that God gave mankind in common 
the bountiful nature of the earth.  Locke then posited that “every man 
has property in his own ‘person’” and in “[t]he ‘labour’ of his body 
and the ‘work’ of his hands.”34  Locke, therefore, deemed it just that 
one who expended labor upon objects would remove them from the 
common and claim them as private property.  Locke added a 
utilitarian dimension by claiming that objects could not be beneficial 
to mankind until reduced to private property.35 
A different natural rights justification for property was developed 
by Freidrich Hegel.36  Hegel’s “personhood theory” is predicated on 
the premise that property provides the mechanism by which humans 
achieve self-actualization.  To Hegel, people’s core is to be found in 
their will.  However, the will needs material objects to express itself, 
and private property is therefore indispensable to the external 
manifestation of the will.  Likewise, society’s recognition of private 
property further contributes to self-realization by respecting human 
agency. Thus, Hegel wrote, there can be no individual freedom 
without private property to provide freedom’s external sphere.37 
 
32 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, Book II, Part V. 
33 Id. (“[T]hrough virtue, the property of each will serve the good of all, according 
to the proverb, 'friends' goods are in common' . . . when he decides how to use his 
own property, each [owner] makes part available to his friends and another part 
available to his fellow citizens.”). 
34 LOCKE, supra note 19, at Chapter V, Part 26. 
35 Id. 
36 A strong argument can be made that Hegel’s perspective, while arguing for the 
importance on moral grounds, does not advance a natural rights-based, or even a 
rights-based theory.  See SHLOMO AVINERI, HEGEL’S THEORY OF THE MODERN 
STATE 132 (1972) (noting that Hegel's concept of human freedom “is not to be 
found in any legendary state of nature, but evolves precisely out of his effort to 
dissociate himself from his state of primeval savagery”); Jeanne Lorraine 
Schroeder, Virgin Territory:  Margaret Radin’s Imagery of Personal Property as 
the Inviolate Feminine Body, 79 MINN. L. REV.  55, 124 n.263 (“Hegel’s property 
theory is intensely anti-naturalistic.”). 
37 F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT ¶¶39-45 (T. M. Knox trans. 1967) (1821). 
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In time, natural rights theories of property fell into eclipse, 
especially in the wake of the Realist movement.38  Today, only a 
handful of scholars rely upon natural rights theories to justify or 
define the scope of property law.  With a handful of notable 
exceptions, such as Richard Epstein’s qualified endorsement of a 
Lockean concept of property39 and Margaret Jane Radin’s embrace of 
a version of Hegel’s ideas about the importance of property to 
personhood,40 most scholars have based their understandings of 
property on a model where property is justified by utilitarianism and 
defined by positive law. 
B. Positivism and Conceptualism 
Perhaps the most famous attack on natural rights theories was 
launched by Jeremy Bentham, who scathingly dismissed natural 
rights: 
Right ... is the child of law; from real laws come real rights; 
from imaginary laws, from laws of nature, fancied and 
invented by poets, rhetoricians, and dealers in moral and 
intellectual poisons, come imaginary rights, a bastard brood 
of monsters….  Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural 
and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense – nonsense 
upon stilts.41 
Naturally, Bentham was equally as dismissive of property rights as 
natural rights.  In his view, “[p]roperty and law are born together, and 
die together.  Before laws were made there was no property; take 
away laws and property ceases."42  Bentham suggested, instead, a 
utilitarian basis for the law, an idea that eventually bore fruit in such 
frankly utilitarian legal analyses as the burgeoning economic analysis 
of law.   
During the nineteenth century, however, while natural rights 
theories continued to reign supreme, the dominant understanding of 
property rights came to be that of William Blackstone, nominally a 
believer in natural rights, but, in practice, a formalist and 
conceptualist, interested less in the justifications for property law, and 
more in the minutae of its substance. 
 
38 See e.g. Mossoff, supra note 5 at 372 (2003) (“Since the turn of the century, the 
concept of property had succumbed to the acid wash of a nominalism first 
popularized in the law by the legal realists.”).  
39 See e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).  But see notes 202-203 and corresponding text. 
40 See e.g., Radin, supra note 17. 
41 JEREMY BENTHAM, ANARCHICAL FALLACIES, in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY 
BENTHAM 501 (J. Bowring ed. 1962). 
42 JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 113 (4th ed. 1882).   
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In his Commentaries on the Laws of England, Blackstone coined 
a formulation that eventually became the rallying cry of an expansive 
understanding of property.  Property, wrote Blackstone, is “that sole 
and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the 
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any 
other individual in the universe.”43  This famous formulation includes 
several central elements.  First, property is concerned with rights in 
rem, i.e., “those rights which a man may acquire in and to such 
external things as are unconnected with his person.”44  Second, in the 
ideal, property belongs to a single individual, or as Blackstone put it, 
“one man.”  Third, where land is concerned, property rights extend 
indefinitely upwards into the heavens and downwards to the center of 
the earth.45  Fourth, the principal right attached to property is the right 
to exclude “any other individual in the universe.”  While Blackstone 
probably did not intend this result,46 modern theorists associated this 
formulation with an absolutist view of property that eventually came 
to be known, somewhat inaccurately, as the “Blackstonian bundle of 
land entitlements.”  The Blackstonian bundle presupposes impeccably 
demarcated parcels whose boundaries extend upward to the heavens 
and downward to the depths of the earth, and owners with unbridled 
powers and privileges to use, transfer and even abuse the land.47 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, the 
Blackstonian conception had begun to wear.  In a highly influential 
series of articles, Wesley Hohfeld sought to render legal thought more 
coherent by clarifying the basic concepts of the law.48  Concerned 
about the looseness with which legal terminology had been used, 
Hohfeld refined existing concepts and created new ones en route to 
devising a comprehensive legal taxonomy.  Of particular importance 
to our project is his treatment of property rights.  While Hohfeld listed 
ownership as his paradigmatic example of an in rem right, he 
reconceived of in rem rights as mere expressions of in personam 
rights vis-à-vis an indefinitely large class of people.49  Hohfeld also 
pointed out that property as a legal concept comprises not only 
 
43 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, Book 2, 
chapter 1 (1765-1769). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at Book 2, chapter 2. 
46 See e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 
30-31 & n. 176 (1996) (criticizing modern property theorists for misstating 
Blackstone's view of property rights).   
47 Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1362-1363 (1993). 
48 Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 23 YALE L. J. 16 (1913) (hereinafter, Hohfeld I); Wesley Newcomb 
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 
YALE L. J. 710 (1917) (hereinafter, Hohfeld II). 
49 Hohfeld II, supra note 48, at 718-733. 
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rights,50 but also privileges51 and powers.52  He further elucidated that 
the crux of property is not a relationship between a person and an 
object, as Blackstone had suggested, but rather a nexus of legal 
relationships among people regarding an object.53  Hohfeld did not 
intend to create a comprehensive view.  While his analysis of the 
question of whether property should properly be viewed as an in rem 
right has since become a staple of property theory, Hohfeld saw no 
need to address the practical implications of his taxonomy.  Working 
from a purely conceptual perspective, Hohfeld did not concern 
himself with policy issues at all. 
Nonetheless, Hohfeld’s observations are generally credited with 
having created an entirely new understanding of property as a “bundle 
of rights.”54  The “bundle of rights” concept of property denies any 
fixed meaning to the term property, and deemphasizes the importance 
 
50 Hohfeld gives meaning to “right” by comparison to its correlative “duty” through 
an example: “if X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former's land, the 
correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay off the place.”  
Hohfeld II, supra note 48, at 32.  Compare definitions of “privilege” and “power”, 
infra notes 51-52. 
51 For Hohfeld, the antithesis of the right-duty relationship is the privilege-no-right 
relationship.  Thus, “privilege” is given meaning by comparison to the correlative, 
“no-right” by his example: “whereas X has a right or claim that Y, the other man, 
should stay off the land, he himself has the privilege of entering on the land; or, in 
equivalent words, X does not have a duty to stay off.”  Id. 
52 “Power,” in the Hohfeldian taxonomy, has the correlative “liability.”  Thus, a 
“power-holder” is one who has the capacity to alter the legal status of the “liability-
bearer.”  Id.  See also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY, § 3, illus. 
53 This conclusion arises from the observation that rights are by definition 
relationship between people, see supra note 50.  Where there is a right there must 
necessarily be a correlative duty, and an object cannot owe a duty. 
54 Courtney C. Tedrowe, Conceptual Severance And Takings In The Federal 
Circuit, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 586, 589 (2000) (“Wesley Hohfeld first attempted to 
construct a theory of property out of the bundle-of-rights metaphor.”); Penner, 
supra note 11 at 724-725 (stating that Hohfeld “provided the frame in which the 
bundle of rights picture is constructed.”); Merrill & Smith, Property/Contract 
Interface, supra note 4 at 783 (“Although Hohfeld did not adopt the metaphor of a 
‘bundle of rights,’ [his work] … directly anticipates [its] adoption … by the Legal 
Realists.”); Katy Barnett, Western Australia v. Ward: One Step Forward and Two 
Steps Back: Native Title and the Bundle of Rights Analysis, 24 MELB. U. L. REV. 
462, 469 (2000) (“The bundle of rights theory is the dominant paradigm applied by 
Western legal philosophers, combining the theories of Hohfeld and Honoré.”); but 
see Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist Critique of  the 
Disaggregation of Property, 93 MICH. L. REV. 239, 240 n.2 (1994) (deriding the, 
“familiar "bundle of rights" notion,” as, “a vulgarization of Hohfeld's analytic 
scheme ….”); Myrl L. Duncan, In Memoriam: Professor Curtis J. Berger, 
Reconceiving the Bundle of Sticks: Land as a Community-Based Resource, 32 
ENVTL. L. 773, 774 n.1 (2002) (citing William M. Wiecek for the proposition that 
“[a]ccording to one prominent historian, the phrase ‘bundle of rights’ first appeared 
in John Lewis, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED 
STATES 41, 43 (1888).”). 
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of the thing with regard to which the rights are claimed.  In the bundle 
metaphor, each right, power, privilege, or duty is but one stick in an 
aggregate bundle that constitutes a property relationship.  Whether the 
removal of a stick (or set thereof) from the bundle will negate the 
classification of the remainder as property can never be determined in 
advance.55  Thus, the bundle of rights theory transformed property 
into an almost infinitely malleable concept, amenable to numerous 
permutations, and subject to ad hoc decisionmaking.   
A.M. Honore played a decisive role in advancing the bundle or 
rights metaphor by cataloguing a generally accepted list of the 
“incidents” or property or ownership.  Acknowledging that the 
“fashion[ of] speak[ing] of ownership as if were just a bundle of 
rights” might require small modifications in the list, Honore 
nevertheless confidently asserted: 
Ownership comprises the right to possess, the right to use, 
the right to manage, the right to the income of the thing, the 
right to the capital, the right to security, the rights or 
incidents of transmissibility and absence of term, the 
prohibition of harmful use, liability to execution, and the 
incident of residuarity: this makes eleven leading incidents.56 
Importantly, Honore noted that the importance of the list lay in its 
being an alternative to the “distortion” of the past, which saw property 
in the concentration of absolute rights of use, exclusion and transfer57 
in a single individual.  Honore emphasized, by contrast, the lack of 
primacy of any individual stick in the bundle. 
Today, the bundle of rights conception of property rules the 
academic roost.  As Bruce Ackerman noted acerbically, the concept 
has become a “consensus view so pervasive that even the dimmest 
law student can be counted upon to parrot the ritual phrases on 
command.”58   The result has been what some lament as the end of 
property law.  In Thomas Grey’s words,  
“We have gone [] in less than two centuries, from a world in 
which property was a central idea mirroring a clearly 
understood institution to one in which it is no longer a 
coherent or crucial category in our conceptual scheme.  The 
concept of property and the institution of property have 
 
55 Moore v. Regents of Univ. of California, 51 Cal.3d 120, 166, 793 P.2d 479 
(1990) (Mosk, J. dissenting) (“[Though a] … limitation or prohibition diminishes 
the bundle of rights that would otherwise attach to the property, yet what remains is 
still deemed in law to be a protectible property interest … [for, citing People v. 
Walker, 33 Cal.App.2d 18, 20, 90 P.2d 854 (1939)], ‘… property or title is a 
complex bundle of rights, duties, powers and immunities, [and] the pruning away of 
some or a great many of these elements does not entirely destroy the title....”). 
56 Honore, supra note 15 at 113. 
57 Honore added to the list an “immunity from expropriation.”  Id. 
58 Ackerman, supra note 7 at 26. 
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disintegrated…. The substitution of a bundle-of-rights for a 
thing-ownership conception of property has the ultimate 
consequence that property ceases to be an important category 
in legal and political theory.”59 
C. Utilitarianism 
As the legal conceptualization of property changed, so too did the 
justifications for property.  The seeds planted by Bentham struck root, 
and today, many influential scholars justify property on instrumental 
and positive grounds.  Today, there exists a widespread agreement 
that property law exists by order of the law, and that the law orders 
property in response to societal needs, rather than in obeisance to a 
moral command or the natural order of the universe.60   
Property, like many other legal fields, has been heavily 
influenced by the movement to apply economic analysis to legal 
questions.  Credit for generating the field has been ascribed at 
different times to Oliver Wendell Holmes,61 Ronald Coase62 and 
Richard Posner;63 today, however, it is Coase’s ideas that have had 
the most lasting impact in the field.  Like much of modern law and 
economics, the two organizing principles of the analysis of property 
law are externalities and transaction costs.  Negative externalities are 
costs created by one actor that are borne by another.  Classical 
economics views externalities as a market failure that prevents 
 
59 Grey, supra note 4 at 69, 74, 81. 
60 To be sure, there remain some natural theory defenses of property, especially 
those sounding in Locke’s theory.  See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Property Right in 
Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual 
Property, 102 YALE L. J. 1533 (1993) (proposing a natural rights-based theory of 
intellectual property).  Indeed, Locke’s theory of natural rights in property continues 
to influence courts today, especially in the area of intellectual property.  See, e.g., 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002-03 (1984) (citing Locke's 
Second Treatise as support for their holding that trade-secret rights can be 
considered “property” under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment). 
61 See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 187 (1994) 
("[Holmes’] writings, studded with quotable aphorisms, set the intellectual agenda 
of the law for the entire twentieth century. Legal realism, pragmatism, sociological 
jurisprudence, law and economics, and critical legal studies are all elaborations of 
themes announced by Holmes."); see also RICHARD POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 13-
15 (1995). 
62 See, e.g., George L. Priest, Gossiping About Ideas, 93 YALE L. J. 1625, 1629 
(1984) (book review) (“The conceptual revolution that provided the vision … was 
the Chicago School law and economics of Ronald Coase.”). 
63 See, e.g., Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980s, 50 OHIO ST. 
L. J. 599, 605 (1989) (“… these 'hardliners' of the Chicago School (the founding 
fathers) … advocated strong claims based on the law-and-efficiency hypothesis … 
associated with the views of Judge Richard A. Posner ….”). 
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otherwise competitive markets from achieving allocative efficiency.64  
Ronald Coase revolutionized the field by noting that externalities will 
only lead to inefficiency where transaction costs impair private 
bargaining.  In the absence of transaction costs, he wrote, parties 
would always negotiate to the efficient result notwithstanding 
externalities.65  While Coase paid no heed to the content of property 
as such, his analysis set the groundwork for subsequent contributions. 
Harold Demsetz built on Coase’s foundation in advancing his 
important evolutionary theory of private property.  Strikingly, 
Demsetz’s point of departure was identical to Locke’s—a 
hypothesized early state of nature in which property was held in 
common.  However, Demsetz’s explanation of the transition from 
commons property to private property was very different.  Demsetz 
noted that in comparison with commons, private ownership permits a 
single owner to internalize most costs and benefits, and greatly 
reduces the number of people exposed to externalities.  Thus, 
Demsetz expected private property to arise wherever the gains 
produced by internalization exceeded the transaction costs involved in 
establishing the property right and the legal system to protect that 
right.66  Interestingly, Demsetz’ justification for property was not 
accompanied by any extended analysis of the concept or content of 
property.  Thus, Demsetz unwittingly contributed to the further 
disintegration of the notion of property by signaling the divorce of 
normative from descriptive property theory. 
A new level of ambiguity was added to scholarly understandings 
of property in the law and economic literature by Guido Calabresi and 
Douglas Melamed.  Working from the basis of Coasean perspective, 
Calabresi and Melamed devised a tripartite menu of protecting legal 
entitlements consisting of inalienablity rule protection, property rule 
protection, and liability rule protection.67  Entitlements protected by 
an inalienability rule may not to be transferred even with the consent 
of the owner.  Those protected by a property rule may be transferred 
at the owner’s discretion for the price set by her.  As for entitlements 
protected by a liability rule, they may be taken by third parties in 
exchange for the payment of a price to be determined by a third party; 
the owner has no veto power, and must suffice herself with the 
compensation she receives.  The taxonomy devised by Calabresi and 
Melamed, although ingenious, hopelessly confused the concept of 
 
64 PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 756 (15th ed. 
1995). 
65 R. H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 13-14 (1988).. 
66 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 
350 (1967).  
67 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972). 
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property. For while the term property rule protection implies a tight 
relation to property, this allusion is misleading. 
Calabresi and Melamed elected to attach “property” to a type of 
legal enforcement of what they termed “legal entitlements.”  By doing 
so, Calabresi and Melamed effectively added a third layer to the 
already bifurcated property analysis.  Alongside the normative 
justifications for property and the descriptive analyses of property’s 
incidents, Calabresi and Melamed described property in a hitherto 
unfamiliar sense as a mode of protection that enables entitlement 
holders to enjoin nonconsensual uses of their entitlement—a power 
they dubbed “property rule protection.”  Moreover, Calabresi and 
Melamed aggravated the confusion at the descriptive level by 
suggesting that any legal entitlement subject to property rule 
protection, thus conflating the entire Hohfeldian vernacular into a 
single, catch-all term that does not discriminate between property 
rights and other legal rights.   
Yet another division of property was introduced by Yoram 
Barzel.  Barzel distinguished between “economic property” which he 
defined as “the individual’s ability, in expected terms, to consume the 
good (or the services of the asset) directly or to consume it indirectly 
through exchange,” and “legal property,” which he defined as those 
economic property rights that are “recognized and enforced, in part, 
by the government.”68  Economic property, for Barzel, is an 
exceptionally broad term, encompassing the rights of anyone with any 
ability to consume the good in any fashion.  For instance, in Barzel’s 
view, a car thief is a co-owner of a car along with the title-holder, 
because each has the ability to consume, in certain circumstances, a 
portion of the attributes of the asset. 
Barzel too relied upon Coase’s insights to argue that the crux of 
property is the allocation of rights in environments of positive 
transaction costs.  Barzel’s model stipulated that private contracting 
would invariably fail to capture certain valuable attributes of assets.  
The legal institution of property, on Barzel’s view, simply organized 
some forms of protection for those asset attributes not addressed by 
optimal contracting.  For Barzel, therefore, property is a residual 
institution that is subordinated to the institution of contracts; legal 
property an even less significant factor, concerned with some 
instances in which the state might protect economic property rights.  
As Barzel put it, “[a]t the heart of the study of property lies the study 
of contracts.”69  Yet, as Smith and Merrill astutely observed, Barzel’s 
analysis suffers from a potential baseline problem. Barzel’s analysis is 
predicated on the primacy of contracts over property, but “one cannot 
 
68 YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 3-4 (2d ed. 1997). 
69 Id. at 33. 
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enter into contracts over the use of resources without some baseline to 
determine who contracts with whom.”70 
In the final tally, the positivist and utilitarian analyses have 
splintered the institution of property in several ways.  Positivists, for 
their part, have driven a wedge between descriptive and normative 
dimensions of property.  Utilitarians, for theirs, contributed to the 
disjointedness by breaking the concept of property into legal rights 
and economic rights (Barzel), and divorcing the issue of primary 
rights from the issue of enforcement (Calabresi and Melamed).   
D. Relational Conceptions of Property 
In juxtaposition to the utilitarian and conceptualist property 
theories, a different analysis arose in recent years emphasizing the 
interpersonal relationships surrounding property rights.  The most 
notable work in this genre is Margaret Jane Radin’s Property and 
Personhood.71  Building on Hegel’s theory, Radin introduced an 
important distinction between personal and fungible property.72  An 
object belongs in the former category if it “if its loss causes pain that 
cannot be relieved by the object's replacement.”73  Contrarily, it 
comes within the latter, if it “is perfectly replaceable with other goods 
of equal market value.”74  Personal property constitutes one’s self; 
fungible property is held for “purely utilitarian reasons.”75  Radin, 
then, suggested that all objects may be ordered on a continuum that 
runs from personal to fungible.76  Moving to the normative 
implications, Radin proposed a “two-level” property system that 
offers differential protection to entitlements in accordance with their 
classification as personal or fungible.77  Furthermore, Radin suggested 
that her theory may imply an obligation on the part of the government 
to “guarantee citizens all entitlements necessary for personhood,” and 
to ensure “that fungible property of some people does not overwhelm 
the opportunities of the rest to constitute themselves in [personal] 
property.”78 
 
70 Merrill & Smith, What Happened to Property, supra note 7 at 377. 
71 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982) 
72 Id. at 960.  It is worth noting that Radin’s project was motivated in part to be a 
response to the dominance of utilitarian theories of property and their celebration of 
the market mechanism as a means for allocating resources.  Radin, by contrast, 
argued that the market has inherent limitations and that certain entitlements should 
be excluded from market exchange. This theme was more fully developed in 
Margaret J. Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987). 
73 Radin, supra note 71, at 959. 
74 Id. at 960 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 986. 
77 Id. at 986. 
78 Id. at 990. 
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Its ingenuity and importance notwithstanding, Radin’s analysis 
further obfuscated the concept of property.  Radin’s analysis implied 
that theorists can no longer simply refer to property as a generic 
relationship among people regarding objects.  Rather, it required a 
careful inspection of the nature of objects subject to property rights 
and the roles they play in constituting the personalities of the persons 
claiming them. 
E. Neo-conceptualism and Utilitarianism 
Most recently, a new body of scholarship has sought to recover 
the conceptual coherence of property by marrying traditional 
doctrines with some basic utilitarian justifications.  In an important 
series of articles, Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith sought to 
reintroduce some coherence to property by stressing the centrality of 
two basic features of the property law: the in rem nature of property 
rights and the numerus clausus principle, under which property rights 
“must track a limited number of standard forms.”79  Merrill and Smith 
observed that “[w]hen property rights are created, third parties must 
expend time and resources to determine the attributes of these rights, 
both to avoid violating them and to acquire them from present 
holders.”  Consequently, the creation of idiosyncratic property rights 
increases the information costs property imposes on third parties.  
Standardization, on the other hand, reduces them.80  
II. A UNIFIED VALUE APPROACH TO PROPERTY 
In this Part, we have two aims.  First, we isolate the core function 
around which property theory is constructed.  Second, we explain 
how property is designed to serve this core function.  Here, we sketch 
the outlines of how basic property rules serve property’s goals, and 
when property reaches the limits of its usefulness.  To eliminate 
suspense, before beginning our exposition, we emphasize our central 
aim.  We propose that the institution of property is designed to create 
and defend the value inhering in stable ownership.  Property 
accomplishes this feat by creating and protecting the relationship 
between a person and assets.  It bears noting at the outset that we do 
not aspire to create a radically different understanding of property; 
rather, we demonstrate that a coherent understanding of property can 
be found by rearranging elements of many of the theories that have 
been discussed through the years. 
 
79 Merrill & Smith, Numerus Clausus, supra note 4  at 5. 
80 Id. at 8. 
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A. Overview: Property and Stability 
In this Section, we assay to provide a more extensive analysis of 
the stability value created by the institution of property.  Our 
conclusion is that a property system with stable rights increases the 
value of assets to users (now owners), and decreases the costs of 
obtaining and defending those assets.  We further posit that a 
universally accepted and centrally-policed property system provides 
the most cost-effective means of producing these benefits in utility as 
a result of economies of scale.  Finally, we show that, generally, the 
benefits provided by property systems increase with the stability of 
the property rights they create. 
Before assaying a survey of the particulars of our analysis, we 
make a preliminary observation.  The institution of property is not the 
only utility-enhancing institution in the law, nor is the value of stable 
ownership the only value that is or should be enhanced by legal 
institutions.  Our point of departure, however, is that the law is 
divided into numerous legal fields such as property, torts, contracts 
and tax in order to handle characteristically similar utility questions in 
common fashion.  In describing property, we discuss how property 
deals with value-enhancing relationships regarding assets, and, in 
particular, how property increases value by creating and defending 
stable ownership. 
Thus, while our sketch of the value-enhancing role of property 
draws on contributions from many theorists, it does more than simply 
reiterate a utility-enhancing view of the purpose of law.  We follow in 
the footsteps of luminaries such as Demsetz,81 Barzel,82 Steven 
Shavell,83 Robert Ellickson,84 Carol Rose85 and others too numerous 
to mention in viewing property law as aimed at enhancing utility, but 
there are some subtle and important differences between ours and 
others’ perspectives.  First, we focus on the utility-enhancing results 
of ownership rather than possession.   As we shall discuss, following 
in the steps of Meir Dan-Cohen,86 when the law of property creates a 
status of owner, it generates value that would not exist absent a 
recognized property relationship.  Second, we emphasize the 
importance of legal recognition of an owner as the ultimate value 
claimant and of the restriction of property to certain types of assets 
rather than to any legal relationship or any asset.  We posit that these 
two facets of our value theory are important to understanding why 
 
81 Demsetz, supra note 66. 
82 BARZEL, supra note 68. 
83 STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2004). 
84 Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315 (1993). 
85 Carol M. Rose, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, 
AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP (1994). 
86 Dan-Cohen, supra note 17. 
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there is a distinct law of property, and not simply a unified field of 
law dealing with all interactions among people in society.  Yet, 
notwithstanding these contributions of our theory, we would be 
remiss in failing to note some of the central points on which we rely 
on our predecessors.  Like them, we view property law as crucial in 
creating value by defending owners’ possession, reducing transaction 
costs for transferring objects, enhancing incentives to invest in 
developing objects, and providing a baseline for some kinds of 
contracts. 
B. Value of Property to an Owner 
In this Section we seek to delineate the various ways in which 
stable ownership enhances the value an owner receives from an asset.  
Those uninterested in the details of how property enhances value for 
the individual owner and for society may safely skip the next two 
sections and continue with Part II.D. 
We begin with a familiar thought experiment of imagining the 
world without property law.  In this world, no doubt, people would 
still have to use objects and they might still value some more than 
others and even be able to maintain a degree of stable possession over 
them. Each potential possessor of an object would then have to 
consider the following utility function before determining whether it 
is worth her while to obtain possession of the object. The expected 
utility from the object is represented in the following equation,  
 
Uo = Po  (So(p) - Do) - Co 
 
where Uo is the expected utility to be obtained from an object; Po is 
the aggregate probability of retaining the object (represented as a 
percentage of the total life of the object through which the acquirer 
manages to retain possession).; So(p) is the use value of the object; Do 
is the cost of defending the object from potential takers; and Co is the 
cost of obtaining the object. 
The utility function may also be expressed as the aggregate of the 
utility to be obtained in any given period over the sum of all of the 
periods of ownership.  We provide the following notation for this 
idea: 
 
ut = pt  (st(p) - dt) - ct 
 
and 
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        T 
UT = Σ pt  (st(p) - dt) - ct = Uo 
        t=1 
 
Here, ut represents the utility obtained by the owner in any given 
period, and UT represents the aggregate utility obtained over all 
periods.  Thus, UT is the equivalent of Uo above.  Similarly, pt is the 
probability of retaining the object in any given period, is the use value 
of the object; st(p) is the use value of the object in any given period; dt 
is the cost of defending the object from potential takers during that 
period; and ct is the cost of obtaining the object in that period.87 
It is evident, then, that the probability of retention and the use 
value are variables that positively correlate with the utility of the 
owner, whereas the cost of obtaining and defending the object are 
negatively correlated with the utility of the owner.  The first question 
for policymakers is, thus, how and to what extent the introduction of 
property law is going to affect these variables.  Initially, we presume 
that policymakers have only one available option for instituting a 
property law regime.  Accordingly, they face a binary choice between 
having a property law regime and not having a property law regime.  
Later, we complicate the analysis by examining the issue of the ideal 
content of property law. 
Assume that a basic property system has three chief components.  
First, it creates a certain status.  The new legal status states that an 
asset – a widget, for example – “belongs” to the owner.  Second, the 
legal system defines the meaning of this status.  That is, it states that 
when a widget belongs to the owner, the owner enjoys a given menu 
of rights, powers, and privileges.  Third, the legal system attaches 
certain practical consequences to the violation of property rules.  For 
instance, the legal system may provide for the punishment of 
trespassers.  It is not necessary for our purposes to assume that all 
violations will be detected or punished. 
What will be the effect of the institution of property on each of 
the four variables we discussed?  Begin with C, the cost of obtaining 
objects.  Our hypothesized property system affects C by altering the 
transaction costs pertaining to two types of information: information 
about status, and secondary information that facilitates transactions.  
Naturally, the creation of status engenders a new type of information 
about assets, i.e., to whom they belong.  The creation of status, 
however, will likely have a very modest effect on information about 
 
87 In describing the aggregate utility as the sum of individual owners’ utilities, we 
ignore the likelihood of externalities, both positive and negative.  The assumption of 
no externalities is, of course, highly unrealistic, and we revisit the topic later in this 
section. 
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assets.  This is because the creation of status does not, on its own, 
lower the defense cost of object owners.  Without enforcement, one’s 
status as owner has little independent meaning.  Hence, the effect on 
cost is contingent, relying upon the effectiveness of the enforcement 
mechanism.  Stated otherwise, the major effect on C created by the 
informational status engendered by our hypothesized property system 
relies upon the system’s effect upon another variable – D, the cost of 
defending the object from possible takers.   
We will return to the subject of cost of defending the object 
momentarily.  First, however, it is important to discuss the secondary 
information effects of formalizing property as a legal right.  The 
availability of legal protection enables asset holders to share 
transactional information, such as the location of the holder, the rights 
she holds, and the potential terms of exchange with the rest of the 
world.  The availability of such information dramatically decreases 
the search and transaction costs for third parties.  As a result, the 
overall cost of purchasing property declines.  Yet, a possible 
countervailing effect must be noted.  In the absence of effective 
protection of property, secrecy would be among the principal 
defensive measure asset holders use to maintain possession.  
Suppression, or concealment, of information about assets increases 
the search costs of potential takers and thus increases the current 
holder’s likelihood of keeping the asset.  Thus, absent enforcement 
measures, it is difficult to determine the net effect of a property 
system on the cost of obtaining assets.  However, once the property 
system includes an enforcement mechanism, we should expect an 
information market to arise, and, therefore, the cost of obtaining 
objects to decline. 
Defensive costs (denoted D), of course, are more directly 
impacted by the property system’s provision of enforcement.  As 
public enforcement mechanisms are made available to private 
property owners, they may substitute the public defensive 
mechanisms for their private protection.  The better the public 
defense, the lower the private investments.  Thus, central legal 
enforcement provides asset holders with the ability to reduce 
significantly defensive costs.  This result obtains even if, as expected, 
legal enforcement of private property rights is less than 100% 
effective. 
For similar reasons, legal enforcement of property rights should 
increase the property owner’s probability of retaining possession of 
her property—the P variable in our formula.  The heightened 
protection effected by legal enforcement makes it less likely that 
assets would be involuntarily taken from their current owners.  It 
should be noted that the availability of status recognition and legal 
enforcement are likely to prompt more voluntary transfers of assets in 
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market transactions.  Thus, the emergence of voluntary exchange may 
well shorten the average ownership term.  However, since voluntary 
exchanges increase asset values (enhancing the utility of both seller 
and buyer), the potential shortening of the ownership term has a net 
beneficial effect.   
The effect of a property system on use value, S(p), is also 
positive.  It bears emphasis, however, that the use value is a complex 
function.  The use value of an object is influenced by various 
parameters such as use revenue, operating costs, learning curves, 
interoperability among assets, and the ability to separate ownership 
from possession or operation.88  The existence of a property system 
does not affect all these parameters uniformly.  Rather than posit and 
plot a separate use function showing the interlocking effects of all 
these elements, we examine the broad effects produced by the 
property system. 
Use revenue represents the gross stream of income derived from 
an asset.  It includes both pecuniary and nonpecuniary elements.  We 
may expect use revenue to increase with the institution of legal 
enforcement.  The affordability of legal protection, and the 
corresponding diminution in reliance on self-help defensive measures, 
should result in increased use of assets, and a corresponding increase 
in the revenue stemming from use.  The emergence of legal protection 
not only facilitates more open and more frequent uses of assets, but 
also makes possible the temporary separation of ownership and 
possession.  Without property protection, asset holders would be 
extremely reluctant to surrender possession since possession would be 
their only cognizable interest in the item.  Any concession of 
possession would have to be accompanied by sufficient security 
measures to compensate the asset holder for the impending risk of not 
having the asset returned.  However, potential possessors would be 
equally reluctant to provide adequate securities to the asset-holders, 
lest their securities never be returned.  Consequently, all property 
arrangements that involve on separation of ownership and use, such 
as, lease, bailment, and licensing, would have to rely on barter.  Such 
barters, however, would be extremely rare and difficult to execute 
since there might not be mutually desirable objects of the requisite 
value, or delivery might be practically impossible. 
The possible voluntary decoupling of ownership and possession 
(or operation) increases the use value of assets in several related 
ways.  First, it makes possible the temporary transfer of assets to 
 
88 In principle, use value may also be affected by depreciation and obsolescence. 
However, since we defined P as the probability of retaining an asset over an asset’s 
life, we need not concern ourselves with obsolescence and depreciation. Both 
obsolescence and depreciation determine the life term of relevant assets, and thus, in 
our representation, they are already incorporated into P.  
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higher value users who cannot afford to purchase the assets.  The 
common practice of taxi cab owners in major cities to give use rights 
to non-owner drivers is one example of this phenomenon.  Leases of 
manufacturing equipment or commercial and residential real estate 
are another.89  These widespread practices would not have been nearly 
as ubiquitous, however, without a system of recognition and 
enforcement of private property rights that allows the temporary 
relinquishment of possession.  The taxi cab driver will likely be one 
more skilled at producing revenue from the cab, while the owner will 
be more skilled at managing a fleet.  The driver’s temporary 
possession thus enhances revenue produced by the asset.  Second, the 
ability to transfer assets to people who are more skillful than the 
owner in using the asset almost invariably entails a reduction in 
operation costs.  For example, the skilled manufacturing machinery 
operator will almost certainly be able to run the equipment at a lower 
cost than that of the less skilled owner.  Together, these two factors – 
higher revenues and lower costs – point to greater profits resulting 
from temporary separations of ownership and possession. 
Stable property ownerships also allow for increased net use value 
resulting from costs of learning how best to use an asset.  The utility-
enhancing effects of stability with respect to learning curves may 
arise in a number of different contexts.  Consider, for instance, an 
expensive asset with a large number of attributes, such as an 
automobile.  Over time and as a result of repeated use, the automobile 
operator will learn the various tics that are unique to the vehicle.  For 
example, she will learn that the brakes best respond to moderate 
pressure, while the accelerator pedal works best when touched lightly.  
Acquiring this knowledge, through time, enhances the ability of the 
operator to extract the maximum utility from the vehicle.  Of course, 
the benefits of learning are positively correlated with the complexity 
of the asset.  Thus, for example, when a company’s assembly line is 
comprised of various pieces of machinery, stability in the right to 
possess produces more efficient use over time.  Naturally, one cannot 
expect the company’s employees to realize the full economic potential 
of the machinery right away.  Indeed, the operation of complicated 
machinery often requires long training periods, and cannot be put to 
use right away.  The acquiring company must let its employees 
familiarize themselves with how each production unit and understand 
how it interacts with other pieces in the line.  Stable ownership 
provides the employees with the opportunity to acquire this 
knowledge.  One would expect that without the longer-term 
possession encouraged by property protection, the investment in 
complex assets that require learning would be much smaller than it 
currently is.   
 
89 See infra, Part VI.C for further discussions of leases and property. 
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The last point is closely related to yet another advantage of stable 
ownership: compatibility.  As the ownership period of various assets 
is extended, the ability to extract utility from other assets will be 
affected by potential interoperability.  For instance, the utility of 
purchasing a particular car seat will be affected not only by the 
likelihood of continued possession of the seat, but also by the 
expected possessory life of the car itself.  The property system’s 
enhancement of the value of one asset can therefore be expected to 
have positive multiplier effects as the increased value spreads to 
other, interoperable assets. 
Finally, the property system may add to the use value of assets 
simply by bestowing the status of ownership on the relationship 
between an owner and asset, even where there is no change in the 
expected ability to defend the asset.  Concretely, an owner of an asset 
is likely to receive some value from the realization that society 
recognizes her as the rightful owner of an object.  This value, labeled 
“ownership value” by Meir Dan-Cohen,90 is wholly separate from that 
created by central enforcement.  Consider, for instance, ownership of 
a home.  The effect of the property system goes beyond the enhanced 
value resulting from secured possession or even sentimental 
attachment.  There is independent value for the homeowner in the 
very creation of the new status.  Dan-Cohen illustrates the value of 
“delight in ownership” by describing the utility owners derive from 
collections of bottlecaps or otherwise worthless items; he posits that 
in these cases the collector “does not value owning these items 
because she values the items, but the other way around—she values 
the items because she owns them.”91 
C. Value of Property to Society 
To this point, we have shown that a property system may enhance 
the utility of individuals regarding objects they possess or use (or 
own).  However, for policymakers, the creation of a property system 
is not solely related to its effect on individuals.  Rather, policymakers 
must determine whether the public creation of a society-wide property 
system is utility-enhancing relative to the private and public 
alternatives (including the possibility of no property system at all). 
 
90 Dan-Cohen, supra note 17 at 1. 
91 Id. at 4.  It is not difficult to guess that Dan-Cohen will disavow our utilitarian 
analysis of the value of ownership.  Dan-Cohen’s account is proudly non-
consequentialist and non-reductionist.  Id. at 1.  He analyzes ownership in 
relationship to constitution of the self, and while he recognizes that ownership is 
constitutive of value, to him this value is tightly linked to an ontological conception 
of the self. 
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The first step in analyzing whether a society-wide property 
system is worthwhile is to extend the analysis we conducted so far 
from the level of the individual to the society.  Tackling the problem 
at a societal level reveals certain network externalities,92 free-riding 
problems, and economies of scale93 and scope94 that suggest both that 
the public definition of property status and public enforcement of 
property rights should be publicly provided.   
We begin with property status, whose utility is directly related to 
the degree to which the property system is known in, and used by, 
society.  Naturally, the more widespread and accepted a property 
system, the more it enhances property status.  As the number of 
people who are aware of and respect the property system grows, there 
are more sources of information about property and a greater 
likelihood of social conventions developing regarding the labeling of 
and respect for property status.  Conversely, as the number of persons 
not respecting the property system shrinks, one may expect a 
decreasing likelihood of a competing system that might send 
confounding signals regarding property status.  In this way, a property 
system is analogous to a communication network whose value 
increases with each every additional subscriber.  And 
correspondingly, the value each subscriber derives from the network 
increases as the network itself grows in size.95 
Moreover, property status is prey to free-riding.  Once property 
rights are defined by an influential actor such that the standard is 
accepted throughout society, even those that do not pay for the service 
of property definition will be able to use the concept of property.  If, 
for example, there is widespread agreement in society that there is 
such a thing as a property right, and that it is obtained by means of 
investing labor in an object, everyone who invests labor in an object 
will likely have her property rights respected, even if she has made no 
 
92 A network externality exists when the utility that a given user derives from a good 
depends upon the number of other users who are in the same network.  Michael L. 
Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 
AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985).  Although we are primarily concerned with 
network externalities of positive effect (as in the decreased cost per user in most 
telecommunications systems), they may also be negative (as in the increased cost 
per user on an overcrowded freeway). 
93 For our purposes, economies of scale are increases in the efficiency of a system 
(decreases in the pro rata cost of the goods or services it delivers) resulting from an 
increase in its size (e.g., the number of users).  See, generally, ROBERT S. PINDYCK 
& DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 227 (5th 2000).  
94 For our purposes, economies of scope are increases in the efficiency of a system 
(decreases in the pro rata cost of the goods or services it delivers) resulting from an 
increase in its scope (e.g., the range of goods or services provided).  Id. 
95 Notwithstanding the presence of network externalities, there may be a role for 
competition in defining property rights.  However, a full examination of the 
question is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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investment in advancing the concept of property rights.  A legal 
property system, in other words, is like many other parts of the legal 
system in that it may be viewed as a public good.96  Consumption of 
its services is nonrivalrous, and there is no effective way of excluding 
consumers from using its services.  Indeed, in describing public goods 
as “instances in which marginal private net product falls short of 
marginal net social product because incidental services are performed 
to third parties from whom it is technically difficult to exact 
payment,” Alfred Pigou had in mind, inter alia, intellectual property 
law.97 
Public enforcement of property systems will also, often, be a 
public good.  Enforcement of property rights through monitoring 
infringements, apprehending transgressors and prosecuting and 
punishing violators has the effect of strengthening the value of all 
property.  In general, there is no way to exclude property owners from 
enjoying the benefit of enforcement and free-riding.98  Notably, where 
property owners can be excluded from enforcement benefits — for 
instance, where enforcement is carried out by social punishments in a 
tightly knit community — there will be less need for public provision 
of a property system.99  This insight is at the core of Demsetz’ 
observation that social interaction regarding property must become 
sufficiently expensive before a public property system is 
 
96 Rex E. Lee, The American Courts as Public Goods: Who Should Pay the Costs of 
Litigation?, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 267 (1985). 
97 A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 151 (2d ed. 1924).  The public goods 
defense of intellectual property rights has proved controversial.  See, e.g., Benjamin 
G. Damstedt, Limiting Locke: A Natural Law Justification for the Fair Use 
Doctrine, 112 YALE L. J. 1179 (2003); Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights 
Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 817 (1990); Roger E. Meiners & Robert J. Staaf, Patents, 
Copyrights, and Trademarks: Property or Monopoly?, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 
911 (1990); Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the 
Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV . 561 (1971); Stephen Breyer, The 
Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and 
Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV . 281 (1970). 
98 While law enforcement officials may refuse to extend protection to certain types 
of property owners, unless the method for refusing can be readily discerned by 
violators, all property owners will earn the benefits.  This is because violators will 
not know in advance whether the property right that they are violating is subject to 
public punishment or not, and they will assess the risk equally across all assets, 
whether publicly protected property or not.  For an example of how defense 
mechanisms that are externally unobservable protect all owners, see Ian Ayres & 
Steven D. Levitt, Measuring Positive Externalities from Unobservable Victim 
Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of Lojack, 113 Q.J. ECON. 43 (1998) (discussing 
and measuring the positive externalities of lojack).  Interestingly, therefore, where 
there is systematic bias, a parallel private enforcement may very well arise in order 
to provide substitute private property protection. 
99 Robert C. Ellickson, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 
(1991). 
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worthwhile.100  The result is that in most cases, enforcement of 
property rights is a public good that should be centrally provided by 
the state.101 
It is possible that property definition and enforcement are also the 
source of economies of scale.  Enforcing property rights involves 
monitoring violations as well as apprehending, prosecuting and 
judging transgressors.  It is quite possible that centralized 
enforcement of property rights will produce these goods more 
cheaply.  Additionally, there may exist economies of scope between 
monitoring and apprehension. 
Enforcement of property rights is likely to be more cost effective 
when it is not performed on an individual basis.  Enforcing consists of 
monitoring violations and apprehending, prosecuting and judging 
transgressors. Given that a single transgressor typically threatens 
multiple property owners, all these functions are likely to be 
characterized by economies of scale.  Rather than require each 
individual owner in the threatened group to fend for herself, it will 
likely be cost effective for the state to provide enforcement. 
A similar analysis applies to apprehension.  The only difference 
between monitoring and apprehension is that the former aims at 
deterring transgressors from carrying out their schemes, and the latter 
at incapacitating them.  As with monitoring, apprehension too gives 
rise to economies of scale, and thus, should be performed in a 
centralized fashion.  In addition, apprehension also involves an 
element of expertise.  Specialized agents being repeat players can 
 
100 See Demsetz, supra note 66, at 350 (“[P]roperty rights develop to internalize 
externalities when the gains of internalization become larger than the cost of 
internalization.”). 
101 See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS 653-766 (E. Cannan ed. 1937) (suggesting that because of 
certain market failures, the administration of justice should be provided by a civil 
government); Lawrence B. Solum, Alternative Court Structures in the Future of the 
California Judiciary:  2020 Vision, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2121, 2173-74 (arguing that 
enforcement of a private property system through a public dispute resolution system 
is a public good that should be provided by the state, rather than leaving aggrieved 
individuals to seek private enforcement through vigilantism); cf. Peter H. Aranson, 
et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 27 (“Because 
private-sector decisionmakers will not necessarily supply public goods at efficient 
levels, such goods may be logical candidates for public-sector production.”); James 
M. Buchanan & Milton Z. Kafoglis, A Note on Public Goods Supply 53 AM. ECON. 
REV. No. 3, at 403, 413 (concluding that if a municipal government ceased to 
provide police or fire departments, and instead people hired these services done, the 
“total resource outlay on providing protection to life and property would be greater 
than under collectivization”).   But see Stuart Banner, Transitions Between Property 
Regimes 31 J. LEG. STUD. 359, 363 (arguing that enforcement of a property system 
may not be a public good because the organizers of the system can deny the benefits 
of the system to certain people by refusing to enforce those people’s rights). 
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pursue violators—be they convertors, trespassers or con-artists—more 
effectively than individual property owners.   
Furthermore, there exist economies of scope between monitoring 
and apprehension. Various monitoring skills reduce the cost of 
apprehending transgressors. Likewise, familiarity with the physical 
and social setting of a given community can considerably lower the 
cost and increase the effectiveness of deterring violations of property 
rights and apprehending violators. Therefore, from an economic 
perspective, there are advantages to having both monitoring and 
apprehension performed by the same agents.  
The final two activities, prosecuting and judging offenders, also 
rely on expertise, and are characterized by economies of scale. Both 
prosecuting and judging require proficient knowledge of the legal 
system and adequate familiarity with the facts of each individual case.  
Furthermore, judicial decisions give new content and meaning to 
property rights, and thus, affect parties beyond those involved in the 
immediate dispute. For all these reasons, it is beneficial to have a 
central property system. 
Perhaps some would argue that the property system as a whole 
produces negative utility, i.e., it diminishes social welfare on the 
whole.  Such claims, however, are difficult to reconcile with the 
empirical data. Numerous studies have demonstrated that property 
systems are crucial to the macroeconomic development of countries.  
Indeed, these works show that long term economic growth is 
intimately tied with the creation and defense of stable property 
rights.102  Moreover, a recent study shows that stable property 
institutions are more important to economic growth than contractual 
ones.103  Consistent with our theory, this study suggests that the 
 
102 Hernando de Soto, Preface to THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT xiii 
(Edgardo Buscaglia et al. eds., 1997) (“Those nations that have succeeded in 
developing a market-oriented economy are not coincidentally those that have 
recognized the need for and secured widespread property rights protected by just 
law.”); Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth:  Hayek Might 
be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 523 (“The data . . . suggest that the strong 
association between secure property and contract rights and growth is causal, and 
not simply a consequence of simultaneity.”); Todd J. Zywicki, The Rule of Law, 
Freedom, and Prosperity, 10 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 22 (“The documented effect of 
increasing rule of law values on economic growth is robust.  Individuals are more 
willing to invest in economic growth where property rights are stable . . . .”); Dani 
Rodrick, Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How to Acquire 
Them 5 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper, No. 7540, 2000), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7540 (“[E]stablishment of secure and 
stable property rights [was] a key element in the rise of the West and the onset of 
modern economic growth.”). 
103 See Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, Unbundling Institutions, NBER 
Working Paper 9934 (August 2003) (demonstrating that property rights institutions 
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property system is crucial to encouraging societal welfare by creating 
and defending stable ownership rights in property.  Finally, such 
scholars as Douglass North have provided the theoretic groundwork 
to the empirical work. 
A far more interesting question that our analysis is not equipped 
to answer is what the optimal level of property protection should be.  
Admittedly, the state may provide more property protection than is 
socially optimal—and indeed, it may even be doing so now. 
Unfortunately, it is not easy to measure precisely the cost of providing 
a property system or property protection in any given case, or the 
precise utility of property vis-à-vis any particular asset or owner class.  
And, while the tradeoff of system utility versus transaction cost has 
not merited extensive examination in general property scholarship, the 
cost benefit analysis has been discussed extensively in the intellectual 
property literature.  In the classic treatment of the subject, William 
Nordhaus demonstrated that the optimal duration of patent protection 
balances the utility of incentives for innovation against the costs 
produced by monopoly-induced deadweight loss.104  Unfortunately, 
determining where this balance lies in the real world has proved to be 
elusive.105  By the same token, it is difficult to imagine empirical 
studies that would accurately identify the precise tradeoff that would 
achieve the optimal level of property protection. 
D. Asset Definition 
So far, our discussion of the utility of a legal property system has 
omitted reference to the question of which assets should be included 
in the system.  As we noted earlier, property is not the only field of 
law and not every asset is suitable for property protection.  The value 
theory of property suggests the central limitations on assets to be 
covered: only assets for which protection of stable ownership will 
enhance social welfare should come under the aegis of property law. 
By necessity, as society changes, the value derived from different 
assets is transformed and therefore the objects of property law will 
 
are more important determinants of economic performance than contracting 
institutions). 
104 WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL 
TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1969). 
105 In the wake of Nordhaus’ early investigations, many others have attempted to 
tackle the problem of optimal patent duration.  See, e.g., Richard Gilbert and Carl 
Shapiro, Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J. ECON. 106, 106 (“When 
patent policy is viewed to be a choice of patent breadth as well as patent length, we 
find that the optimal length may easily be infinite.  The appropriate margin on 
which patent policy should operate may not be patent length, but rather patent 
breadth.”); F.M. Scherer, Nordhaus’ Theory of Optimal Patent Life:  A Geometric 
Reinterpretation, 62 AM. ECON. REV. June 1972 at 422-27 (proposing a 
modification to Nordhaus’ original attempts at modeling optimal patent life). 
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change over time.  Similarly, as the cost of providing property rights 
for asset or owner classes changes, the net utility of providing for 
property rights will change as well. 
The theory of property as protecting stable ownership value 
instantly suggests two types of assets that are not suitable for 
protection under the property system: non-market goods and goods 
for which there is no in rem protection.  Non-market goods are goods 
that will not appear on the market due to lack of demand (because no 
one derives any utility from them) or lack of supply (because they 
may not be cost-effectively protected).  An example of an asset for 
which there is currently no demand is a torn plastic wrapper of a CD.  
An example of an asset that may not currently be cost-effectively 
protected is fair weather.  The second category excluded contains 
goods for which there is no in rem protection.  An example of a good 
falling into this category is a beautiful singing voice.  The voice qua 
voice may not be appropriated by third parties.  No surgery or other 
medical procedure will do. 
A different limitation on assets’ suitability for property protection 
stems from asset size and the threat of asset fragmentation.  Here, the 
withholding of property protection is not categorical but 
individualized.  Take ownership in land, for instance.  Needless to 
say, in principle, ownership in land is a recognized property interest.  
However, if the interest is devised to too many devisees, or allowed to 
descend to too many heirs, it may become so fragmented as to lose 
virtually all of its value.  Imagine that Blackacre is a sixteenth-acre 
estate (2,722.5 ft.2) that, after several generations of partitioning and 
re-partitioning, is divided into 1,249 separate parcels of less than 2.2 
square feet each.  Practically speaking, it is unlikely that the small 
parcels (each roughly 18 inches by 18 inches) will prove to be 
commercially useful in any fashion, and it is difficult to imagine the 
development of any residential use or sentimental value.  In short, as 
the asset becomes too small, it is unlikely to be of any value 
whatsoever.  And, indeed, as the asset becomes too small to be one 
where any value would be created or defended with stable ownership, 
it moves beyond the range of the legal property system.  The loss of 
value in such cases is quite close to the problem Michael Heller 
dubbed the “tragedy of the anti-commons.”106  In Heller’s examples, 
Blackacre is not physically divided, but each of the devisees and 
descendants receives an increasingly small ownership share of the 
whole.  Thus, each transferee, by virtue of being a co-owner, has veto 
power over any decision about the use or transfer of the asset.  The 
creation of multiple veto powers, with the attendant holdout problem, 
 
106 Heller, Anti-Commons, supra note 4 at 624 (“When too many owners have [the] 
privileges of use, the resource is prone to overuse--a tragedy of the commons.”). 
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often leads to insoluble asset lock-ins and thus causes underutilization 
of assets.  Whether the asset is divided physically, or its ownership is 
divided among many owners, the solution is clear: a larger asset in the 
hands of fewer owners.  This can be accomplished by either 
recombining the micro-parcels, or reaggregating the micro-shares of 
ownership.  Either way, the legal system should discourage stability 
in ownership until the asset is one for which there is value in stable 
ownership. 
Yet another category of assets unsuitable for property rights 
results from the cost of providing property protection.  One current 
example of such an asset is ideas.  Under the prevailing view, we have 
no property rights in pure ideas, as such, partially because the cost of 
protection would outweigh the benefit.107  It must be borne in mind, 
though, that the cost of property protection depends in large measure 
on technology and new technological advances may make it cost-
effective to create new property rights in yet unprotected resources.  
Technology determines not only the feasibility frontier but also the 
effectiveness of the protection.  For instance, the invention of barbed 
wire enabled farmers near perfect protection against roaming cattle, 
and consequently enhanced the value of their land.108  Indeed, it is 
quite feasible that an asset will become a suitable subject of property 
law primarily due to reductions in the cost of property protection, 
rather than any changes in the revenue derived from the asset.  
Conversely, the Napster cases and the digital information revolution 
generally may be read to suggest that an asset may cease to be a 
suitable subject of property law because of an increase in the cost of 
protecting it. 
In subsequent sections we demonstrate how law deals with 
problem of identifying and restricting property protection to the right 
kind of assets. 
 
107 See Galanis v. Proctor & Gamble Corp., 153 F.Supp. 34, 37 (“The general rule of 
law is that a mere idea is not property . . . .”); Douglas Y’Barbo, On Legal 
Protection for Electronic Texts:  A Reply to Professor Patterson and Judge Birch, 5 
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 195, 216 n. 52 (“[T]he high administrative cost of protecting 
ideas is no doubt important; it is simply too difficult to determine an idea's source, 
e.g., whether it is original or not.”);  Stephen C. Carlson, The Law and Economics of 
Star Pagination, 2 GEO. MASON L. REV. 421, 432 (“[T]he administrative costs of 
defining the idea are quite high [because determining] the scope of the protected 
idea would be problematic.”). 
108 TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 
29-30 (1991) (describing the impact that barbed wire had on ranchers in the 
Western United States when it was introduced in the 1870s). 
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E. Property and Contract 
A final point should be made about the relationship between 
contract and property in our understanding of property.  As we noted 
previously, modern economic analysis presumes that property is the 
leftover category when contract is exhausted.109  Economic analysis in 
the Coasian vein notes that in a zero transaction cost world, people 
concerned with the use of a particular asset may arrive at perfectly 
contingent contracts that efficiently dispose of the asset, and make 
property irrelevant.110  Thus, the standard pose of such theorists is that 
of Barzel, who views property as merely setting up some default 
allocations and rights that provide the basis for further bargaining.111  
To be sure, it is often noted that there will be cases that transaction 
costs will bar further transacting, and in such cases the property rules 
will be dispositive.112  But the bulk of analysis is not devoted to these 
residual cases. 
In our view, this approach has the analysis precisely reversed.  
More frequently than not, there are many potential claimants for 
assets, and perfectly contingent contracts would need to be negotiated 
with a large number of parties in order to render property rules 
irrelevant.  Recall our earlier example of the conveyance of an 
automobile.  While the buyer and seller can likely tend to all their 
affairs by contract, they will almost certainly be unable to extend the 
contractual network very far into the rest of the world.  Indeed, often 
so many parties would have to be bargained with that contractual 
solutions are unavailable, and property rules are the ultimate 
determinant of the societal welfare to be devoted from the object.  In 
other words, only rarely can bargaining be counted upon to produce 
the efficient use and allocation of assets; in most cases, the property 
rules will determine whether social welfare is maximized.  It is for 
this reason that property rules must be carefully tailored to maximize 
the value produced by property institutions.  
III. THROUGH THE VALUE PRISM 
Having presented the basics of our theory, it is fitting in this Part 
to acknowledge our intellectual debt to some of the preexisting 
contributions.  Our unified theory of value has many theoretic 
antecedents.  As we noted, a value component in property theory is 
present in the writings of Locke, Marx and numerous others, and 
 
109 See supra text accompanying notes 70-71. 
110 BARZEL, supra note 68 at 7 
111 Id. at 33. 
112 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Anti-Property 102 
MICH L. REV. _____ (2004) (discussing how transaction costs may bar further 
transfer of property rights). 
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more recently, in those of Radin and Barzel.113  Each of them uses 
value in a different way.  We are no exception to the trend; our use of 
value diverges from prior use.  Furthermore, in a significant departure 
from current conceptualist scholarship, we use value as the key 
component in unifying property as a legal institution.  In this Part, we 
compare our theory with other existing theories, examine their fit with 
ours, and highlight remaining differences.  Here, we engage a wide 
variety of scholarship ranging from neo-conceptualism to law and 
economics. 
A. Labor Theory of Value 
The differences between our use of value and that of Locke and 
Marx should be readily apparent.  Although, Locke and Marx 
proffered radically divergent theories, and each of them was 
concerned with a dissimilar set of issues, both used value in a similar 
fashion.  They both used value as the connecting link between labor 
and ownership.  The critical premise in their writings was that labor 
enhances the value of objects, a commonality that led them both to 
argue that the laborer is entitled to the added value component.114  
Locke used this reasoning to provide a natural rights basis for 
ownership;115 Marx used it to argue for empowerment of 
proletariat.116  The labor theory of value was at one time very 
influential; however, its importance has declined.  As should be clear 
to the reader, our value theory does not rely on the labor theory, and 
the labor component of value has no independent importance for us. 
B. Value and Personhood 
The contrast between our approach and that of Radin warrants 
more elaboration.  Working from a personhood perspective, Radin 
divided the world of objects into two categories: nonfungible and 
fungible.117  Nonfungible goods are those that are instrumental in 
constituting their owners' personality.118  As a result, nonfungible 
objects, such a wedding ring, create special value for their owners 
above and beyond market value.  Fungible objects, by contrast, lack 
uniqueness and serve no purpose in constituting the self.119  Radin 
suggested that property law should track this distinction and treat 
 
113 See supra Introduction, and Part I.D. 
114 For an overview of the Marxian labor theory of value, see Fernando Vianello, 
Labour Theory of Value, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: MARXIAN ECONOMICS 233 (John 
Eatwell, Murray Milgate & Peter Newman, eds. 1990) 
115 LOCKE, supra note 19, at Chapter V, Part 26. 
116 See KARL MARX, I CAPITAL, part III (1867). 
117 Radin, supra note 71 at 960. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 986. 
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goods differentially based on their classification as nonfungible or 
fungible.120  For example, Radin proposed to restrict injunctive relief, 
or property rule protection, to cases involving nonfungible goods, and 
in all other cases, to offer only compensatory damages, or liability 
rule protection.121  Furthermore, while Radin acknowledged the 
possibility that owners may ascribe idiosyncratic value to fungible 
objects, she derided this phenomenon as "object fetishism" that 
should not be condoned.122 
Our model sheds new light on Radin’s theory and permits the 
translation of some of Radin’s insights into the language of an 
economic approach.  In essence, Radin’s insight regarding the 
distinction between “personal” and “fungible” property may be 
viewed as a subset of a larger phenomenon: the gap between reserve 
price and market price.  This gap may be due to the sentimental 
reasons related to what Radin calls “self-constitution” or “personal 
embodiment.”123  Such, for example, may be the case with a wedding 
ring, which if lost “causes pain that cannot be relieved by the object’s 
replacement.”124  In the cases of sentimental attachment, the owner 
finds emotional utility in the asset that is not accessible to other 
market participants, and, therefore, will not be reflected in the market 
price.  In other words, the price at which the owner will agree to sell 
the asset (the reserve price) will exceed the price that ordinary market 
participants will pay (the market price).  However, other elements 
besides sentimental value may also account for this gap between 
reserve and market prices.  An owner, for example, may have a 
unique skill that allows her to extract greater utility from a rare 
commercial asset.  For instance, Alice may be a musician who is 
particularly adept at playing period harpsichords from the early 18th 
century.  Since the market for such harpsichords is exceptionally thin 
and Alice’s ability to extract utility exceptionally high, if Alice’s 
harpsichord is destroyed, Alice’s loss may well exceed the catalogue 
price of the harpsichord.  A different example is provided by goods 
whose enjoyment necessitates a learning period.  Consider again the 
automobile with the oversensitive acceleration pedal; the learned skill 
regarding the automobile’s operation creates a unique ability in the 
owner to extract utility from the asset at a low cost.  As with the case 
 
120 Id. 
121 See id. at 988 (“[T]here would be a nice simplicity in hypothesizing that personal 
property should be protected by property rules and that fungible property should be 
protected by liability rules.”). 
122 See id. at 961 (arguing that the idiosyncratic value people might ascribe to 
fungible property does not deserve the same level of protection as personal property 
because “anyone who lives only for material objects is considered not to be a well- 
developed person, but rather to be lacking some important attribute of humanity”). 
123 Id. at 958. 
124 Id. at 959. 
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of sentimental value, the essential feature of all these assets is that 
they have unique qualities that make them lack perfect substitutes in 
the market place.  This lack of substitutes engenders a rational gap 
between the owner’s reserve price and the market price. 
An important distinction must be made here between the rational 
values that inhere in stable ownership, on the one hand, and 
misperceptions in value that are often used to exemplify the 
“endowment effect,” on the other.  The endowment effect causes 
individuals to value goods in their possession more than the identical 
goods in someone else’s possession.125  At its most basic level, the 
endowment effect may be viewed as a decisional heuristic that is 
sometimes rational, and sometimes not.  Thus, for example, 
participants in one famous study were randomly awarded either 
lottery tickets with a payoff of $50, or, alternatively, $3 in cash.  The 
lottery recipients were then given the opportunity to sell the lottery 
tickets for $3, and the cash recipients the chance to buy the lottery 
tickets for $3.  Remarkably, while 38% of the cash recipients opted to 
buy lottery tickets, a whopping 82% of lottery ticket recipients 
rejected the cash offers and kept their tickets.126  The cause of this 
disparity between the perceived value of the lottery ticket depending 
on possession was the endowment effect, and, at least in this 
experiment, it reflects a decision-making quirk or a misperception, 
rather than any rational protection of value.  By contrast, there are 
cases where the valuation embodied in the endowment effect reflects 
a rational assessment that “a bird in the hand is worth two in the 
bush.”  For instance, as Richard Posner noted, persons in possession 
of an object may capitalize potential replacement costs in its valuation 
where the object lacks ready substitutes.127  Indeed, even where the 
object would ordinarily be thought to have close substitutes, the 
development of habit and familiarity, or sentimental connection may 
have created rational idiosyncratic value.128  Likewise, owners and 
possessors may have better information about the object’s value. 
Our value theory addresses all the situations in which a rational 
gap exists between the owner’s reserve price and the market price.  
 
125 See, e.g., Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. 
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 44 (1980) (discussing the endowment effect theory). 
126 Jack L. Knetsch & J.A. Sinden, Willingness To Pay and Compensation 
Demanded: Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures of 
Value, 99 Q. J. ECON. 507 (1984). 
127 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 95-96 (5th ed. 1998). 
128 Where there are only close, but not identical substitutes, there may be substantial 
costs involved in learning how to enjoy the full value of the substitute item, whereas 
all such costs in the currently possessed item have already been sunk.  As a 
consequence, the marginal cost of continuing to use the possessed item will no 
longer include the cost of learning how to use it, while such costs will continue to 
be reflected in market prices.  
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The emphasis our theory places on the value of stable ownership 
implies, inter alia, greater protection to people who derive unique 
value from assets.  It is noteworthy that two effects of legal property 
rights—status conferral and enforcement—not only protect the unique 
value owners derive from certain objects, but also facilitate the 
creation of such value by enabling owners to develop certain value-
enhancing expectations and patterns of behavior. 
Before turning to the differences between our and Radin’s 
understandings of value, we must underline a significant point of 
convergence.  Radin’s important insight, for our purposes, is that a 
center of property analysis must be how owners relate, in practice, to 
the asset protected by law, rather than merely upon the details of the 
relationship dictated by law.  Radin’s treatment expanded preexisting 
legal analysis by highlighting the need to take account of how people 
value objects irrespective of the legal protection afforded to property.  
Consequently, in evaluating the desirability of property law, it is 
necessary to pay heed to the broader network of valuable relationship 
between objects and owners.129  
However, our conception of value diverges from Radin's in 
several important respects.  First, Radin's account recognizes no 
independent importance in the economic value of stable ownership.  
She is only concerned with a special category of objects that promotes 
the owner's sense of self.  Thus, her use of value is much more limited 
than ours.  Second, and perhaps most importantly, Radin's use of 
value involves a normative value judgment.  Radin believes that 
idiosyncratic value is desirable only with respect to nonfungible 
goods; in all other cases, she rejects it as object “fetishism.”  Our 
account of value is descriptive.  It makes no judgments as to the 
desirability or provenance of idiosyncratic value—it simply 
recognizes that it exists, and it seeks to protect this value.  Third, and 
consequently, Radin's view lacks the explanatory power of property 
law in its current form that our account offers.  Finally, for Radin, 
value provides a means for creating a particular subset of property.  In 
our view, value has a much broader role; it provides the unifying 
theme for all property law. 
C. Value and Economic Property 
A different contribution to the academic discourse on value in 
property was made by Barzel.  Barzel preceded us in placing value in 
the center of property. Indeed, in some ways, Barzel’s theory may be 
viewed as a radical version of our property theory.  The touchstone of 
Barzel’s analysis is “economic rights,” a very broad conception that 
 
129 Notwithstanding these criticisms, our model does incorporate some of Radin’s 
insights. 
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leads him to view the role of the law as almost trivial.  To him, an 
economic property right is the ability to derive value from an asset.130  
The law’s function is merely to recognize or fail to recognize this 
ability.131  In keeping with the tradition of Coasean law and 
economics, Barzel views contracts as the primary legal institution for 
extracting value, with property serving as a mere background for 
exchange.132  
The gist of Barzel’s conception may be illustrated by a brief 
discussion of his approach to theft.  Barzel views ownership as 
residual claimancy on the value that may be derived from an asset.133  
The legality of the claimancy is of no consequence to Barzel.  Thus, 
for example, an automobile is “owned” not only by Betty, whose legal 
“ownership” is registered with the state, but also by any person who 
sees potential value in the asset.  The list of such people, on Barzel’s 
view, may be endless.  Even legally owned assets generate “value 
spillovers” for third parties, and all potential value claimants vie for 
the opportunity to extract value from the asset.  As the residual 
claimant, Betty, the legal owner of the automobile, has only a limited 
right to appropriate the value that “remains” in the after other 
claimants, including thieves like Charles, satisfy their claims on the 
automobile.134  Barzel does not ignore the law.  But to him, the law 
only affects the relative positions of the multiple claimants vis-à-vis 
one another, making value extraction easier for some, and more 
difficult for others.135  Thus, legal protection may “enhance” the value 
held by a specific owner and change the relative positions of the 
various “owners” vis-à-vis one another, but legal protection has a 
strictly secondary role.136 
We contend that Barzel’s view fails to take full account of legal 
property rights.  The property system, in our view, not only allocates 
value among claimants, it also creates new value that has not 
previously existed.  As we showed, the creation of the status of legal 
property, in and of itself, enhances the value of assets.  Yet, property 
law clearly does not confer the same status on all potential claimants 
of assets, whom Barzel dubs “owners.”  The point and purpose of 
property law is to separate rightful owners and from unlawful 
claimants.  And it is only for the former that property status creates 
value.  Moreover, as Barzel acknowledges, the provision of legal 
enforcement further enhances the value of assets for their owners.  As 
 
130 See BARZEL, supra note 68 at 3. 
131 Id. at 4. 
132 Id. at 33. 
133 Id. at 3-9. 
134 See id. at 141. 
135 Id. at 141-142. 
136 Id. at 4. 
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we discussed earlier,137 explained, legal enforcement of property 
rights is designed to keep assets in the hands of legally recognized 
owners by deterring nonconsensual takings.  As a general rule, the 
legal system makes nonconsensual takings prohibitively costly.  Of 
course, the legal system cannot guarantee a detection rate of one 
hundred percent—which means that some non-consensual abuses of 
property will go unpunished.138  Yet, the legal system can offset 
imperfect detection by imposing harsher penalties to apprehended 
offenders.139 
To be sure, some of Barzel’s important insights, while contrary to 
legal-centric scholarship, cannot be denied.  Barzel is correct in 
noting that, even after the law defines ownership, assets continue to 
have spillover effects, such that value is still available to many other 
claimants.  Moreover, Barzel is right in stating that the law is simply 
one of a number of possible tools involved in protecting the value in 
an asset.140  The fact that the law identifies Betty as the owner of her 
automobile does not prevent Charles from successfully stealing her 
car when Betty absent-mindedly leaves the key on the front seat.  The 
protection offered by the law is limited to the ability to invoke the law 
enforcement system, and even this ability is often limited.  The result, 
as we discuss in the next section,141 is that legal protection should be 
viewed as neither absolute, nor as costless.  As we show, there may be 
 
137 See supra Part II.B. 
138 Barzel makes much of the fact that even those not legally designated to have any 
status regarding an asset – such as thieves – may nevertheless illicitly enjoy some of 
the value of the property with some degree of certainty.  BARZEL, supra, note 68 at 
141.  Certainly it is true that the harm occasioned by certain violations of property 
rights may simply be too small to warrant legal action.  For example, it does not 
make economic sense for homeowners to pursue legal action against the occasional 
driver who trespasses on their property to make a U-turn.  Nonconsensual tastings 
of fruit in supermarkets probably fall in this category too.  See id. at 6.  The fact that 
not all violations of property rights are being litigated or prosecuted, however, does 
not turn the violators into legal owners of the relevant property.  The fruit-tasters do 
not enjoy any legal protection for their ill-gotten gains, or any cognizable legal 
status.  They may rely on no stability in ownership; indeed, they have no legally 
recognized “ownership” at all, and must hide their gains and restrict them to levels 
beneath the true owner’s marginal cost of protection.  Thus, the distinction between 
legal property and economic property relies not simply on the obtuseness of the 
state in failing to recognize certain types of ownerships; rather, legal property is a 
distinct category with important value-creating aspects. 
139 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:  An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. 
ECON. 169, 183 (“A reduction in [the probability of apprehension] ‘compensated’ 
by an equal percentage increase in [the level of punishment] would leave [the 
number of offenses] unchanged, but would reduce the loss, because the costs of 
apprehension and conviction would be lowered by the reduction in the probability 
of apprehension.”). 
140 BARZEL, supra note 68 at 7-9, 85-104. 
141 Infra Parts IV.A., D. 
   WHAT PROPERTY IS 42 
 
times where it is not cost-effective to rely upon the law of property to 
defend value. 
Yet, more broadly, we reject Barzel’s approach to the domain of 
legal property.  Our conception of property is one in which a a legal 
property system is a substantial source of creating and protecting 
value.  For this reason, in focusing solely on the contractually 
allocated value in assets (or what he terms the “economic rights” in 
property), Barzel elides the essential contribution of a legal 
framework to the value that inheres in property.  In our view, property 
law does more than simply allocate and recognize values produced by 
“economic property.”  Rather, the law’s recognition and protection of 
property rights creates value for owners.  It is the stability in 
ownership afforded by the law that creates the possibility for 
developing new kinds of valuable relationship with, and uses of, the 
property that would otherwise be unavailable.  Legal property must, 
therefore, be at the center of property analysis, rather than simply an 
adjunct.  To Barzel, property owners must share their gains with all 
other claimants from contract-holders to thieves.  Our value theory, 
by contrast, sees the owner as the primary beneficiary of value, and 
others merely as the beneficiaries of positive externalities.  The owner 
is not merely the main beneficiary from legal protection, but also the 
one who decides how much to develop the property and how much to 
invest in self-help measures.142 These combined means determine 
how much value is left to others and the ease with which they can 
capture it.  Under the value theory, then, Barzel has the relationship 
between property owners and other claimants precisely reversed. 
D. Value and Information Theory 
Next, we compare the results of our value theory of property with 
those of an information-based conception.  As we noted earlier, 
building on the assumption of the centrality of in rem rights in 
property, Merrill and Smith argue that property rights come in a fixed 
number (numerus clausus) in order to promote easy and cheap 
distribution of information about the rights pertaining to assets.  
Under Merrill and Smith’s theory, property law aims at an optimal 
standardization of forms, in order to reduce the cost of investigation 
 
142 Paradoxically, the owner may even occasionally want to reduce the value of 
property to herself when doing so effects an  even greater proportional reduction in 
the attractiveness of the property to outside claimants.  Douglas W. Allen, The 
Rhino’s Horn: Incomplete Property Assets and the Optimal Value of An Asset, 31 J. 
LEG. STUD. 339 (2002).  For example, students on college campuses where bicycle 
theft is a common problem have been known to intentionally deface their own 
bicycles by scratching the paint or removing decals.  The intention, of course, is that 
by so defacing, their bicycle will appear less attractive to would-be thieves when 
sitting next to a shiny new bicycle with a well-known brand’s decals. 
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an asset’s provenance and its attendant rights.  Contracts, on the other 
hand, create only rights in personam.  Accordingly, they generally do 
not affect third parties, and thus, do not require standardization. 
We posit that the value theory offers a different perspective on 
the contract-property distinction.  To see this, consider the case of 
form contracts.  Dataholic Software Company sells its software 
application in the following package: the software is encoded upon a 
CD-ROM, which is sealed within an envelope, which, in turn, is 
enclosed within a shrink wrapped package.  On the outside of the 
envelope is printed a standard form contract which, inter alia, informs 
the purchaser Elaine that by opening the envelope, she is agreeing to 
the contractual licensing terms printed upon it.143  Obviously, there is 
no opportunity for Elaine to bargain with Dataholic about the terms of 
the contract, or even to inspect them before consummating her 
purchase.  With such a wide information gap between seller and 
buyer, there is a strong argument for legal policing of the contract 
terms, or mandatory disclosure, in order to produce optimal 
standardization of the contract.  Yet, the fact that the need for 
information necessitates a rule of numerus clausus does not alter the 
fact that a form contract is not property.144  The form contract is not 
governed by the law of property, and it does not need in rem 
protection.  This result is fully consistent with our value perspective. 
Employing our nonconsensual taking test, one can see that standard 
form contracts need not receive in rem protection. Stealing the 
preprinted form that specifies the contractual terms does not 
substantially deprive the software owner of value. In fact, since the 
software company prints the contract in the thousands (or millions), 
 
143 This description of the location of the contract terms within the package closely 
approximates industry practice.  See, e.g., ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 
1449 (7th Cir. 1996) (describing the popularity of “shrink wrap licenses,” and 
upholding their validity).  For criticism, see Julie Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace:  
The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management”, 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 
487 (criticizing the 7th Circuit’s reasoning in ProCD because “the opportunity to 
engage in comparison shopping, so important to the court in theory, does not seem 
particularly attractive if one must purchase each product to learn the terms 
governing its use”). 
144 It is important to note that the laws of many foreign countries provide for 
regulatory pre-approval of form contracts.  See, e.g., Standard Contracts Law (Isr.) 
1982, 37 L.S.I. 6 (1982-1983) (allowing users of form contracts the opportunity to 
obtain government approval of certain types of “restrictive terms,” and immunizing 
such approved terms from judicial invalidation for a limited time.).  See generally, 
Larry Bates, Administrative Regulation of Terms in Form Contracts:  A 
Comparative Analysis of Consumer Protection, 16 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1, 44-90 
(discussing treatment of form contracts in the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, 
and Israel); Arthur Lenhoff, Contracts of Adhesion and the Freedom of Contract: A 
Comparative Study in the Light of American and Foreign Law, 36 TUL. L. REV. 481 
(1962) (discussing the approaches that various foreign countries have taken to form 
contracts).  
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the evidentiary value of any given envelope is nil, and the 
replacement cost is restricted to the value of the paper. 
This is not to say that Smith and Merrill err in demonstrating the 
link between information and optimal standardization.  However, it is 
our claim that this link has little to do with the law of property, per se. 
IV. REORDERING PROPERTY 
As we showed in the Part I, confusion now reigns regarding all 
aspects of property: its purpose, its nature and its enforcement 
mechanisms.  In Parts II and III, we sought to reintegrate property by 
proposing a unified conception of property based on the idea that 
property is a legal mechanism designed to create and defend certain 
types of value.  Our aim in this Part is two-fold:  First we identify the 
chief concerns of any theory of the law of property, thereby providing 
a centralized framework for evaluating competing claims.  Second, 
we show that careful attention to the importance of value – and 
particularly, the value that inheres in stable ownership – to the theory 
and law of property can supply answers for all four of the central 
property questions in our centralized framework. 
Our exposition here begins by explicating the four foundational 
questions of property theory.  To understand what distinguishes 
property from other legal fields, it is first necessary to enumerate its 
essential characteristics.  By contrast to the seeming aim of current 
scholarship to fragment the field,145 our goal is to discern a unifying 
logical structure.  We posit that the field of property, of necessity, 
addresses four interlocking questions.  Specifically, we show that the 
law of property must address these elements: (1) what things146 are 
protected by property law, (2) vis-à-vis whom, (3) with what rights, 
and (4) by means of what enforcement mechanism.  We discuss them 
in order, with two central aims.  First, we demonstrate that our 
framework provides an indispensable prism for evaluating the fit of 
 
145 See, for example, Stephen R. Munzer, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 31 (1990) 
(decrying the "claim that … the notion of property is too fragmented to allow for a 
general theory"). 
146 We should make several semantic notes here.  First, in using the term “thing,” 
we do not seek to restrict property only to physical items.  Rather, as we shall show, 
any item which can be the locus of the types of value with which property is 
concerned can be labeled an “thing,” including intangible items such as ideas.  
Second, in referring to a person in our analysis, we do not mean only a “natural 
person”; as in other fields of law, corporations and other types of organizations may 
be considered persons.  Finally, to avoid excessively cumbersome formulations, we 
generally refer to both person and thing in the singular, even in cases where the 
property relationship could also apply to multiple persons or things.  On this last 
point, however, the reader should bear in mind that, as we show, in many ways the 
ideal property relationship is between a single owner and a thing.  Where the subject 
of property is fragmented among many owners, inter-property conflicts may arise. 
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extant scholarship with a holistic understanding of property.  Second, 
we show that the concept of value illuminates each of the four 
elements in the holistic perspective we construct.  
Before turning to our discussion of the four questions, it is 
paramount to emphasize that it is the combined discussion of all four 
questions which shapes the realm of property.  The particular 
discussion of each question adds an element to the property edifice we 
seek to construct.  As befits a holistic approach, each question is a 
step towards the ultimate goal of redefining property as a field; none 
of them alone can accomplish this task.   
A. Which Assets 
As we noted in Part II, the traditional conception of property as 
thing ownership faded in the last century and has been replaced by the 
new conception of property as an “abstract bundle of legal 
relations.”147  And, indeed, time has proved that a “thingness” 
oriented conception of property poses real difficulties in a world 
where the law of property is often applied to legal abstractions such as 
patents and copyrights.  In the information age, where the most 
valuable property rights are often in intangible goods, “thingness" is 
ever more remote from the law of property.148 
Yet, as many scholars have noted, the idea of property as “things” 
has continued to maintain its hold on the popular imagination.149  The 
importance of this phenomenon extends beyond the semantic 
confusion created by popular usage of “property” as a term for things, 
and technical usage of the term “property” to denote legal rights 
related to those things.  The popular view, in fact, reflects the accurate 
perception that the law of property has an important relationship with 
things.  This means not only that the layperson sees property as a right 
in rem – a characterization we address in the next section – but also 
 
147 See Michael Heller, Symposium: Critical Approaches to Property Institutions: 
Three Faces of Private Property, 79 OR. L. REV. 417, 430 (2000) (surveying the 
transformation of property from “ownership of thing” to a “bundle of rights.”).  
148 For a recent call to revive this conception in patent law see John R. Thomas, 
Symposium:  The Post-Industrial Patent System, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA 
& ENT. L. J. 3, 10 (1999) (how patent law concerns the physical instantiation of 
technological knowledge rather than that knowledge itself).  See also John R. 
Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. Rev. 1139, 1147 
(1999). 
149 See Munzer, supra note 145, at 22, 74 (finding that in light of the “essential 
materiality of property … the popular conception, which views property as things, is 
not, as some philosophers and lawyers might think, wholly misguided.”).  Cf. Grey, 
supra note 4 at 76-79 (suggesting that although lay people naively cling to a unitary, 
objective, physicalist ideal, they will eventually accept the specialist view of the 
disintegrating nature of property, and property will lose its traditional inspirational 
role). 
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that property rights do not exist in the absence of a thing to which 
they can attach.150 
It is crucial to clarify that in the context of property, the term 
"thing" extends beyond physical objects.  The property usage is 
capacious, including not just tangible items, but also ideas and 
qualities, as per some dictionary definitions.151  Accordingly, 
intangible goods, such as ideas,152 expressions153 or symbols154 may 
be proper subjects of property law.  Moreover, as we will show, while 
the restriction of property to things is not meaningless, in practice, 
there do not appear to be real assets in the world to which property 
categorically cannot apply merely due to the absence of a “thing.”  
This may be demonstrated by employing our theory of value.  
To remind the reader, our value theory of property maintains that 
the institution of property is designed to create and protect the value 
that inheres in the stability of ownership of assets.  This definition 
implies the first limitation on property law: where stable ownership of 
assets provides no greater value, protection of rights in the asset lies 
beyond the ken of property law, and no one should be able to claim 
property rights in them.   In theory, this means that no property rights 
should be recognized in any abundant assets, i.e., where the assets 
may be obtained costlessly and all conceivable demand for them may 
be met.  In practice, however, infinitely available and costless 
obtained goods are not to be found. 
Consider the example of air.  At one time, we might have thought 
of air as the infinitely available, costlessly obtained asset.  One might 
think of air as an inexhaustible resource; Frances may breathe all she 
wants, without ever reducing the air supply available to Gloria or to 
future generations.  It could seem pointless to the point of absurdity, 
therefore, to allow for the possibility of property rights in air.  
However, as it turns out, air is not infinitely available, nor always 
costlessly obtained.  If Heavyhanded Enterprises should decide to 
open several large coal-fired plants, Ivy who lives nearby may find 
that her air is no longer so freely available.  Similar observations 
 
150 See Wendy Gordon, An Inquiry Into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of 
Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1380 
(1989)  (describing the need for a physical embodiment in copyright with works of 
authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression). 
151 See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1864 
(3d ed. 1992) (among the definitions of "thing" are "1. An entity, an idea, or a 
quality perceived, known, or thought to have its own existence…. 2.b. An entity 
existing in space and time….  3. Something referred to by a word, a symbol, a sign, 
or an idea; a referent….") 
152 See 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (1952); P. Kanagavel, Intellectual Property Rights: A 
Comprehensive Overview, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 663 (2003). 
153 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (1976); Kanagavel, supra note 152. 
154 See 15 U.S.C.A. §1125 (1946). 
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might be made about other apparently abundant resources, such as 
water.  As a general rule, it seems unlikely that any resource can be 
found in the world, that is inexhaustible and costless obtained. 
Economically minded readers may notice the similarity with the 
concept of public goods.  The term public goods denotes goods whose 
consumption is nonrivalrous, and whose benefits are non-
excludable.155  Nonrivalrous consumption means that consumption of 
the good by one person does not rival the consumption by another.  In 
practice, this means that the good is inexhaustible, like the air in our 
example of Frances and Gloria.  Non-excludability refers to the 
inability of the good’s owner to exclude consumers.  The result of 
these two features of public goods is understood to create the need for 
government provision; other than altruists, private persons would 
provide only those goods from which they could enjoy sufficient 
benefits to warrant the provision.  In saying that inexhaustible goods 
are not a good subject of property law, we are implying that pure 
public goods would not properly be considered property. 
However, as economists have noted, pure public goods do not 
exist in the real world.  As Buchanan observed, “the elements of 
demand for any good whether this be classified as wholly, partially, or 
not at all ‘public’ by the standard criteria, may be factored down into 
private and collective aspects.”156  Air, in other words, has aspects of 
both a private good and a public good.  As such, it cannot be excluded 
categorically from the realm of assets to which the law of property 
can apply. 
To be sure, as we shall see, not all assets fall within the realm of 
the law of property.  However, this is not due to their intrinsic 
unsuitability as improper “things” to be viewed as property.  Rather, 
as we shall see in our discussion in the following section, it is due to 
their inability to be properly protected by a regime of in rem rights. 
B. Vis-à-vis Whom 
 When Blackstone described property as the law of things,157 he 
was reflecting the historical understanding of property as creating 
 
155 Not all agree on the precise definition of public good.  Harold Demsetz has 
argued that a good is a public good solely on the grounds of non-rivalrous 
consumption.  To Demsetz, a public good which satisfies the additional condition of 
non-excludability is a “collective good.”  Harold Demsetz, The Private Production 
of Public Goods, 13 J. LAW & ECON. 293 (1970).  See also RICHARD CORNES & 
TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB 
GOODS 6-7 (1986). 
156 JAMES M.  BUCHANAN, 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES M.  BUCHANAN: 
PUBLIC FINANCE IN DEMOCRATIC PROCESS: FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND 
INDIVIDUAL CHOICE 21 (1999). 
157 BLACKSTONE, supra note 43 at book 2, chapter 1. 
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rights in rem, i.e., against the rest of the world.  In time, however, the 
in rem characterization was eclipsed by Hohfeld’s argument that any 
in rem right is essentially a multiplicity of in personam rights.  In 
time, Hohfeld’s analytical move was seen to have stripped the in rem 
characterization of any particular importance in property law.  Thus, 
property law could be described as a collection of rights that vary not 
only in the “sticks” included in the bundle, but also in the persons 
against whom such “sticks” are effective.158 
Recently, Merrill and Smith have sought to revive the primacy of 
the in rem aspect of property law.159  As the reader may recall, Merrill 
and Smith’s theory posits that property is a right in rem and expounds 
the informational implications of this characterization. It is critical to 
note, however, that Merrill and Smith do not explain why property 
creates rights in rem; they simply assume that it is.  While we 
commend Merrill and Smith’s attempt to highlight the informational 
component of property law, and join in their effort to restrict the law 
of property to in rem rights, our aim is broader.  Our goal is to step 
back and provide an explanation for why property rights must be in 
rem.  We show that in rem rights are important to property not simply 
for taxonomic reasons a la Hohfeld,160 nor for reasons of notice a la 
Merrill and Smith;161 rather, we demonstrate that in rem rights are 
crucially important for defending value that lies at the heart of 
property protection. 
As a result, we are able to show that the value theory of property 
indicates why protection of rights in rem may be the singularly most 
important item in defining a legal right as based in the law of 
property.  One important result is that a value-based explanation 
provides a better screen for distinguishing between property and non-
property rights than does one based in information-provision. 
To understand how the value theory underscores the importance 
of in rem rights in property law, it is necessary, once again, to 
reiterate the locus of value created and protected by property law 
under the value theory: stability of ownership.  Under the value 
theory, in rem rights have a primarily creative force; in rem protection 
establishes the possibility of maintaining value in stability and, often, 
by sentiment.   
This is best explained by way of example.  Let us return to the 
example of air employed in the previous section.  Imagine that Joyous 
Enterprises decides to market a new product called Summit Air.  The 
company sends its representatives to Himalaya peaks where they 
 
158 See supra note 54 and corresponding text. 
159 See supra notes 79-80 and corresponding text. 
160 See supra notes 48-53 and corresponding text. 
161 Merrill & Smith, Property/Contract Interface, supra note 4 at 790-791. 
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scoop air into cans and hermetically seal the containers.162  The sealed 
cans are then sold in special Joyous Outlet Stores, where consumers 
are advised to open the cans close to their faces in order to enjoy a 
brief whiff of mountain air.  Here, as with Heavyhanded Enterprises 
in the previous section, Joyous Enterprises has captured the value of 
air – an asset of value that may properly be the subject of property 
law.  Our question now, is whether Joyous should be recognized as 
having in rem rights in its cans of air, or whether in personam rights 
will do.  The answer, obviously, is that in rem rights are necessary to 
defend the value of the cans of air.  If Joyous had no in rem rights, 
significantly fewer cans would appear on the market, if indeed any 
appeared at all.163 
In a world without in rem rights, Joyous (and the rest of us) 
would have to contract with all potential transferees, whether 
consensual or nonconsensual, in order to create a legal in personam 
means of transferring possession.  The result would be one in which 
only a few persons could enjoy stable rights of possession of assets.  
Joyous, for example, might be able contract with all its employees not 
to take the cans.  It might even place a security guard outside its 
Outlet Stores and require all entering consumers to agree to pay for 
any merchandise removed from the premises.  However, the 
consumers could not possibly enter into contracts with every possible 
taker once they left the store.  As a result, the only consumers for 
Joyous’ Summit Air would be those consumers who wished to 
breathe the air within the store, or those for whom it was cost-
effective to protect the cans outside of the store without benefit of the 
law. 
In rem rights are a mechanism for protecting value that is 
encapsulated in stable ownership of assets, and provide a measure of 
legal protection for the asset’s value that any holder may enjoy.  The 
result is that in rem protection is indispensable for realizing the full 
potential value of the asset. 
We may contrast this with an example an in personam right in the 
same asset.  Yet again consider rights in air.  This time, however, we 
focus on tradable pollution mechanism employed in various 
environmental protection statutes.  These provisions depart from the 
 
162 While the example may sound somewhat exotic, we invite the reader to consider 
the example of Christian pilgrims who bottle water from the Jordan River in order 
to enjoy “Holy Land baptismal waters.”  The water is entirely unremarkable – 
except, perhaps for its lack of cleanliness – but for its provenance. 
163 Without in rem rights, potential possessors of the cans would have a lower 
probability of retention and an increased cost of defending the object from potential 
takers, thus lowering the overall value of the utility function and positioning more 
of those possible customers to decide that it would not be worthwhile to purchase 
from Joyous Enterprises.  See infra, Part II.B. 
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usual regulatory limitations on pollution emissions, and seek instead 
to establish a market in pollution rights by allowing polluters to 
purchase regulatory rights from other polluters.  Imagine that both 
Katastrophic Kilns and Lovely Lava are manufacturers whose 
emissions of sulfur dioxide are regulated by the Clean Air Act.  The 
Act establishes a nationwide a maximum of tonnage of sulfur dioxide 
that may be emitted every year by all factories.164  Individual emitting 
factories must possess the necessary permits to cover their expected 
emissions, which they may purchase from a government auction, or 
from other permit owners.  Lovely Lava examines the market for 
emission permits, and determines that it would be more efficient to 
install new scrubbers to reduce its emissions.  Katastrophic Kilns on 
the other hand calculates that purchasing permits is the cheaper route.  
Katastrophic Kilns therefore buys Lovely Lava’s permits. 
Should the permits be protected by property law?  As we shall 
see, the in rem nature of property law dictates a negative answer, and 
our value theory explains why.  We can easily see that the permits 
themselves do not embody an in rem right.  The relevant right to 
pollute is granted by the regulatory authority and it is enforceable 
only against that authority.  Thus, were the CEO of Miserly 
Manufacturers to break into the headquarters of Katastrophic Kilns 
under cover of darkness and steal the permit documentation for 
Miserly Manufacturers, she would not have acquired any right to 
pollute nor would Katastrophic Kilns lost any.  The rights embodied 
in the permits in other words are in personam rights that move not 
with the object but through authorized channels approved by the 
regulatory agency.  The value theory explains why this is the right 
result: the permit documentation is merely paper evidence of the right, 
rather than the right itself.  Theft of the documentation is therefore, 
theft only of paper, that does not convey any rights; merely 
possessing the paper does not take away any of the value enjoyed by 
the right-owner in its permit.165  With no value of stability in 
ownership at stake, there is no reason to employ the law of property.  
Indeed, if Katastrophic Kilns were granted no rights to possession of 
the paper at all, it would still not lose any of its administrative rights. 
We may advance the value understanding of the importance of in 
rem rights by considering a set of additional examples.  First, consider 
a case in which the paper permit stolen by Miserly Manufacturers 
actually conveyed the right to emit sulfur dioxide, rather than merely 
constituting evidence.  Indeed, there are many instances in which 
papers are endowed with the power to dispose of the value which they 
represent.  Bearer bonds, for example, pay a sum of money to the 
 
164 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7651 (2002). 
165 The paper, on the other hand, is an asset whose value will be lost if ownership is 
unstable, and, therefore, it is an asset defended by the law of property. 
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bearer of the bond—the paper itself contains the right to receive the 
money, rather than merely constituting evidence of a debt.  Bearer 
bonds, therefore, are best treated as property themselves, rather than 
as evidence of an in personam claim; bearer bonds’ transferability and 
value relies upon a bearer being able to rely on legally protected 
stability in ownership.  Similarly, if the regulatory authority invested 
in emissions permits the power to emit sulfur dioxide, rather than 
merely making them evidence of the power to emit, the permits would 
best be seen property themselves.  One could conceive of a legal 
regime under which any person who presents a pollution permit 
would be entitled, without more, to the emission units specified in the 
permit. In this scenario, the classification of pollution rights ought to 
be changed from rights in personam to rights in rem. 
The broader insight provided by these examples is that the 
regulatory authority has the ability, by defining the administrative 
right, to create in rem property rights, or merely to create in personam 
rights.  This offers an important refinement to Charles Reich’s classic 
The New Property.166  Reich observed that in modern time, a great 
deal of wealth is created and distributed by the government through 
administrative processes.  He labeled such assets “new property.”167  
Our analysis demonstrates that Reich classification is only partly 
accurate.  While he was correct in noting that regulatory authorities 
may create new property, he erred in grouping all wealth-enhancing 
or transferring administrative rights under the heading of property. 
An alternative way to employ our test is to pose the question: 
would a taking of the physical embodiment of the asset substantially 
deprive the holder of the value?  If the answer is yes, then the asset 
should receive in rem protection, and consequently be considered 
property.  Note that this alternative formulation does not require a 
taking of the entire value.  Stealing a company’s pollution permit, or a 
taxi-cab driver’s medallion, imposes the cost of getting a replacement.  
But in neither case is the value of the underlying asset substantially 
diminished.  Of course, the state may artificially create assets – such 
as bearer bonds, or cash – that carry their value in their physical 
embodiment, and consequently, necessitate in rem protection. 
In rem protection may also extend to intangible items such as 
ideas and expression.  In such cases, does our test hold?  We posit that 
intangible property may be examined by means of our “taking test,” at 
least in theory.  Imagine, for instance, that in the future a mind-
reading device could be created.  In this futuristic world, any person 
 
166 Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964)  (classifying 
government largess as the new property and advocating for protection for the rights 
associated with it). 
167 Id. at 734-37.  (including all forms of government largesse, from welfare benefits 
to federal Social Security to taxicab medallions). 
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in possession of the device can steal other people’s ideas at will.  
Assume, now, that Naïve Nancy comes up with a brilliant tune for her 
next blockbuster album.  Excited, she calls her best friend 
Overbearing Otto and breaks the news to him.  Before the call reaches 
its conclusion, Otto takes out his personal mind reader, presses the 
appropriate buttons and downloads the song directly into his dull 
mind.  Otto then records the song and performs it for pay, diluting the 
market for Naïve Nancy.  Otto has thus succeeded, by means of a 
taking, in reducing the value of the song to Nancy, while greatly 
increasing its value to him.  While this example seems like a strange 
cross between Johnny Mnemonic and Men In Black, it teaches a 
valuable lesson.  There are items in the world, such as the emissions 
permit in the previous example, whose appropriation – even in the 
most outlandish futuristic scenario – would not convey value.  There 
is thus a sharp divide between assets for which in rem protection may 
add value, and those for which it does not. 
Of course, the law of property conforms to the world as it is, 
rather than the world as it might be.  This means, for example, that 
while the music in Nancy’s head is, in theory, an appropriate subject 
for in rem protection, there is no need to extend such protection in a 
world without mind-reading machines.  And, indeed, the law declines 
to extend property protection to copyright, absent a physical 
embodiment of the expression.168  Admittedly, the physical 
embodiment of an expression does not partake of precisely the same 
qualities as an ordinary physical asset.  For example, if Peter were to 
steal Quincy’s laptop, the entire value of the asset would be 
transferred from Quincy to Peter.169  The case of a copyright is rather 
different.  If Ralph wanted to steal the copyright in Stephanie’s book, 
he would find that doing so is impossible.  True, Ralph could deprive 
Stephanie of some of the value of the copyright by printing 
counterfeit copies and putting them on the market.  But, of course, 
that would only dilute some of the value Stephanie would derive from 
her copyright.  It is important to note that Stephanie too cannot 
concentrate the entire value of the copyright in a single object and 
protect it adequately.  In general, we may say that while an asset with 
no tangible expression whatsoever is a poor candidate for property 
protection, an asset might be a worthy aspirant for property rights 
even in the absence of complete physical expression of the asset’s 
value.  The question to be answered is whether the physical 
expression contains a substantial portion of the value – as if 
Overbearing Otto were to steal Naïve Nancy’s first recording of her 
 
168 See Gordon, supra note 155.  Similarly, in the real world, patent protection will 
not obtain in the absence of some tangible evidence of the idea. 
169 We assume, of course, that, Peter need not fear that Quincy will be able to 
recover the stolen computer. 
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tune – or merely an empty symbol of the asset – as with Katastrophic 
Kilns’ emission permit as stolen by Miserly Manufacturers. 
Most importantly, perhaps, our test offers a convincing rationale 
for why contracts should be considered as creating rights in 
personam.  Assume that Toni and Ursula enter into a contract for 
provision of computer services.  Victor, Toni’s envious competitor 
(and law school dropout), decides to break into Toni’s office and steal 
a copy of the contract in the hope of harming Toni. Unfortunately for 
Victor, his fiendish plan is foiled by his analytical confusion.  Clearly, 
stealing Toni’s copy of the contract is not going to deprive her of any 
substantial value—in fact, it will probably deprive her of no value 
whatsoever.  Not only is the physical contract in this case merely 
evidentiary, but also Toni could insure herself against Victor’s (and 
others’) folly by making several copies of the contract and storing 
them in different places.  Because nonconsensual takers of contract 
copies cannot eviscerate the value inherent in the deal for the 
contracting parties, contracts do not necessitate in rem protection. 
C. Which Rights 
The “bundle of sticks” conception views the law of property as 
creating an almost random variety of rights and duties that the law 
recognizes in the standard owner.170  While Honore’s list of property 
“incidents”171 has been extremely influential,172 there is little 
agreement among scholars as to the relative importance of sticks in 
the bundle,173 and even as to the usual bundle’s contents.174  The 
 
170 Cf. Jeanne L. Shroeder, Never Jam To-Day: On the Impossibility of Takings 
Jurisprudence, 84 GEO. L. J. 1531, 1554 (1996)  (arguing that despite the 
metaphor’s own implication, property is not a random or arbitrary collection of  
different rights). 
171 See Honore, supra note 15. 
172 See, e.g., Penner, supra note 11, at 713 (noting that Honore’s incidents and “[t]he 
bundle of rights analysis of property . . . serve[s] as a ‘dominant paradigm’ under 
the aegis of which working lawyers and academic theorists may attend to particular 
problems in the law of property”); Note, Distributive Liberty:  A Relational Model 
of Freedom, Correction, and Property Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 859, 861 n.5 (1994) 
(noting, with respect to Honore’s eleven incidents of property, that “[d]espite its 
oversimplicity, this conception still operates as a background understanding of 
property”). 
173 Compare Teena-Ann V. Sankoorikal, Using Scientific Advances to Conceive the 
“Perfect” Donor, 32 SETON HALL L. REV 583, 588-89 (2002) (“Under the ‘bundle 
of rights’ framework, the hallmarks of a property right include the ability to control 
something and the ability to prevent others from interfering with that control.”), 
with Sarah Harding, Justifying Repatriation of Native American Cultural Property, 
72 Ind. L.J. 723, 759 (1997) (“the familiar notion of a bundle which includes an 
abundance of rights, most prominently, the rights to possess, use, capitalize on, and 
exclude others”), and Arun S. Subramanian, Note, Assessing the Rights of IRU 
Holders in Uncertain Times, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 2094, 2098 (2003) (suggesting 
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confusion has arisen in particular in several specific contexts.  For 
instance, in the field of regulatory takings, many scholars have 
despaired of the possibility of determining how many property rights 
must be “taken” by government regulation,175 before “property” is 
 
that in analyzing indefeasible rights of use – a transactional form common in the 
telecommunications industry – under a bundle of rights framework “there are four 
important factors to consider:  (1) use, (2) physical occupation, (3) control, and (4) 
economic possession”). 
174 See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1517, 1532 
(2003) (“There is [not] an a priori list of entitlements that the owner of a given 
resource inevitably enjoys . . . .”); Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The 
Reconstitution of Property:  Property as a Web of Interests, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 281, 285 n.20 (2002) (citing and describing at least six different scholarly lists 
of the incidents of property).  Compare DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 11 at 86 
(listing the rights to possess, use, exclude, and transfer), with Richard A. Epstein, 
Property and Necessity, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 2, 3 (1990) (listing the rights 
to possess, use, and dispose of), and Honore, supra note 15, at 113-24 (listing the 
rights to possess, use, manage, receive income and capital, and maintain security; 
the incidents of transmissibility and absence of term; the prohibition of harmful use; 
and the liability to execution).  In fact, modern statutory and judicial conceptions of 
certain “property” classes explicitly limit the incidents granted to those classes.  For 
example, although the right to use and enjoyment is typically regarded as a core 
incident of property, no such right exists in a patent grant.  See, e.g., Bloomer v. 
McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 548 (1852) (“The franchise, which the patent grants, 
consists altogether in the right to exclude every one from making, using, or vending 
the thing patented, without the permission of the patentee.  This is all that he obtains 
by the patent.”); see also Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property:  Rights and 
Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L. REV. 135, 171-72 (2004) (discussing the discrepancies 
between the traditional incidents of property and the incidents granted in intellectual 
property). 
175 Compare, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (finding no taking where 
a state regulation required owners to cut down red cedar trees infected with a virus 
that could kill apple trees) with Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Mid-Florida 
Growers, Inc. 521 So. 2d 101 (Fla.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988) (holding full 
and just compensation required when state, pursuant to its police power, destroyed 
healthy trees).  Compare also Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (elimination of mining rights is 
a taking) with Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 
(1987) (elimination of mining rights is not a taking).  See, e.g., BRUCE A. 
ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 3 (1977) (takings 
jurisprudence is “ set of confused judicial responses”); Andrea L. Peterson, The 
Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part I – A Critique of Current 
Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1304 (1989) (“[I]t is difficult to 
imagine a body of case law in greater doctrinal and conceptual disarray.”); Carol M. 
Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 561 (1984); Raymond R. Coletta, Reciprocity of Advantage and Regulatory 
Takings: Toward a New Theory of Takings Jurisprudence, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 297, 
299-300 (1990) (Takings jurisprudence is a “chameleon of ad hoc decisions that has 
bred considerable confusion…”).  Indeed, there is a small cottage industry in 
stringing together quotes proclaiming the hopelessness of assaying to understand the 
law of takings.  See, e.g., Zach Whitney, Comment: Regulatory Takings: 
Distinguishing Between the Privilege of Use and Duty, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 617, 617 
(2002) (“Commentators have eloquently described the law of takings as ‘engulfed 
in confusion,’ ‘suffer[ing] from its own inconsistency,’ ‘a problem of considerable 
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considered taken such that the Constitution demands compensation.176  
Scholars have frequently noted, for instance, that policing the 
boundaries of regulatory takings is particularly difficult in the era of 
the “bundle of rights” property conception.177  In this Section, we 
show the importance of the value theory both in shaping the list of 
rights attending property ownership and in determining which of the 
rights are indispensable.  Later, in Part VI, we consider some of the 
implications of the value approach to such conundrums as the proper 
scope of regulatory takings. 
The bundle of rights conception has spawned various 
formulations of the incidents of property.  The most minimal, and 
possibly most widely accepted, formulation enumerates the rights to 
use, exclude and transfer as the constitutive elements of property.178  
The most expansive one, compiled by Honore, lists as many as eleven 
incidents as the contents of property, yet omits the right to exclude 
considered by many as “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle 
of rights that are commonly characterized as property”179 or even its 
“sine qua non.”180  The view of property as a bundle of rights has 
 
difficulty,’ and ‘a secret code that only a momentary majority of the Court is able to 
understand.’”) (citations omitted); Michael A. Culpepper, The Strategic Alternative: 
How State Takings Statutes May Resolve the Unanswered Questions of Palazzolo, 
36 U. RICH. L. REV. 509, 509 (2002) (“[C]ritics describe the world of federal takings 
jurisprudence as ‘an unworkable muddle,’ as ‘a jumble of confusing holdings,’ and 
as a body of law existing in ‘doctrinal and conceptual disarray.’”) (citations 
omitted).  Cf. Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 
CARDOZO L. REV. 93 (2002) (“Everyone has heard the grumbling about the 
vagueness or messiness of the doctrine of regulatory takings.  In judicial opinion 
and academic assessment alike, it seems almost de rigueur to include at least one or 
two choice sentences of complaint, before going about whatever business the 
opinion or article seeks to accomplish.”). 
176 See U.S. CONST. AMEND V (“.  .  .  nor shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation.”).  See also William B. Stoebuck, A General 
Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH L. REV. 553, 555 (1972) (discussing state 
“just compensation” provisions). 
177 See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Four Questions for Legal Theory, in NOMOS 
XXII:  PROPERTY 351, 365 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) 
(“[If she accepted the bundle-of-rights theory,] the Scientific Policymaker would 
have no choice but to interpret the Takings Clause as . . . protecting all uses once 
they have been legally authorized. But the [constitutional] text does not impose such 
an absurd command.”); Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and 
Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997, 1015 (1999) 
(discussing how “‘private   property’ cannot meaningfully be defined absent 
context.”). 
178 See, e.g., DUKEMINIER & KRIER, , supra note 11 at 86 (listing the incidents of 
property as the rights to possess, use, exclude, and transfer). 
179 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). 
180 Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 
730 (1998). 
   WHAT PROPERTY IS 56 
 
wrought more perplexity than clarity, leading J.E. Penner to conclude 
that “[p]roperty is a bundle of rights’ is little more than a slogan.”181 
The challenge facing the property theorist is to explain why any 
particular list is essential to property, and why it should be preferred 
over its competitors.  The answer to this challenge, we posit, lies in 
the common theme underlying the law of property: the protection of 
value.  Begin with the right to exclude.  Exclusion is essential to 
property owners because it protects stable possession by repelling 
nonconsensual takers and users of the asset.  To return to our 
discussion of the importance of in rem rights to property, intrinsic to 
the nature of property is that it must defend against takings that will 
substantially reduce or eliminate the value owners derive from the 
asset.  From a systemic viewpoint, the right to exclude does exactly 
that.  It engenders the necessary element of stability of ownership 
across the board. 
An important aspect of the value enabled by the right to exclude 
is sentimental or other idiosyncratic value that is not reflected in the 
market price.  Often, owners develop sentimental relationships with 
assets protected by property rights such that their “reserve price” (the 
price at which they would be willing to sell the object) is substantially 
in excess of the price at which the asset is bought and sold in the 
market.  We are by no means the first to recognize this value 
component, and we have already addressed at length the relevant 
scholarship on this topic.182  At present, we suffice by noting that gaps 
between reserve and market prices should be widely observed, and the 
value reflected by this higher reserve price can often be protected only 
by an in rem right that includes the right to exclude nonconsensual 
users. 
Our value-based perspective provides an even more basic 
explanation of such property incidents as use and transfer.  Use 
represents direct extraction of value for the owner, and transfer 
embodies the potential to extract value from the asset by conveying it 
to others who might value it more highly, either for consideration or 
as a gift.  Furthermore, owners may derive value from discretionary 
nonuse of assets.  For instance, Weepy Willa may keep in storage her 
grandmother’s first grade book, and derive sentimental value from her 
mere possession of the object and her secure knowledge that it 
continues to exist.  Honore’s listed incidents of the right to property’s 
income and capital183 should be seen as corollaries of the right to use, 
as interpreted by the value theory. 
 
181 See Penner, supra note 11 at 714. 
182 See supra Introduction, and Part I.D. 
183 See supra text accompanying note 56. 
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At the end of the day, our value based theory offers an auspicious 
opportunity for the law of property to regain its coherence by doing 
away with the enterprise of endlessly compiling competing lists of 
incidents, and adopting, in their stead, a single focus on value.  
Essentially, the value theory of property posits that all property 
incidents are mere manifestations of a central right to enjoy and 
protect value.  This paradigm shift has a number of important 
implications for property law, which we discuss later in Part V. 
D. What Enforcement 
 Enforcement issues were not part of the classic property 
discourse.  They have found their way into the discussion thanks to 
Calabresi and Melamed’s division of the legal protection of 
entitlements into property, liability and inalienability rules.  Of 
particular importance was their choice of the term property rule to 
denote what is essentially injunctive relief.  As Merrill and Smith 
noted, this use does not correspond to the general scholarly 
understanding of property.  While on the surface, injunctive remedies 
might seem a natural expression of the right to exclude, the 
differences between the concepts can be seen on closer examination.  
The right to exclude refers to a right of property owners in the 
abstract; the “property rule” refers to the remedy that the courts will 
afford to the right claimant.  Thus, for example, the fact that Xena 
owns a plot of land, and possesses the right to exclude others, is not 
dispositive of the question of how she may respond to the entry of 
Yvette.  Generally, state laws will only allow Xena a limited right to 
forcibly eject Yvette; thereafter, Xena’s right to exclude may be 
remedied only by turning to law enforcement authorities for relief.  
One might easily imagine the recognition of a right to exclude whose 
breach gave rise only to a claim for monetary compensation (liability 
rule protection, under Calabresi and Melamed’s terminology) rather 
than injunctive relief. 
Nevertheless, the value theory shows that the Calabersi-
Melamedian decision to refer to injunctive relief as “property rule” 
protection captures a correct intuition.  As law and economics 
scholars have noted, property rule protection enables the entitlement 
holder to set the price at which the item will be used or transferred.  A 
fortiori, it also empowers her to refuse to deal altogether and keep the 
object.  Property rule enforcement is therefore instrumental in the 
instantiation of in rem rights: the blocking of nonconsensual takings 
that may substantially deplete the value assets generate for their 
owners.  Hence, the value theory shows that, in general, property 
rules are the proper enforcement mechanism for property rights. 
It bears emphasis that despite the general affinity between 
property rights and injunctive relief, in some cases, it would be 
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justifiable to deviate from the norm and employ monetary damages, 
or, “liability rules” in the Calabresi-Melamedian parlance.  This can 
be seen by returning to the touchstone of the value theory.  Injunctive 
remedies are necessary in order to protect the value derived by the 
owner from the assets; where the owner loses no value by having the 
asset taken and replaced by compensation, there is no longer any 
reason to demand injunctive relief.  Consider, for example, Zelda’s 
property interest in cash.  If a twenty dollar bill were to be taken from 
Zelda’s purse, under most circumstances, Zelda would lose no value 
if she were compensated with a different twenty dollar bill.  This 
example, however, also demonstrates the limitations of the principle. 
If the stolen twenty dollar bill were the precise one received by Zelda 
for the sale of her first short story, she might have enjoyed 
sentimental value in ownership of the bill, such that a different twenty 
dollar bill would no longer constitute adequate compensation.  Even 
in cases in which the asset is devoid of sentimental value, there may 
be value in protecting the stability of the property in its owner’s 
possession by means of injunctive relief.  Obtaining compensatory 
relief and purchasing a replacement item are not costless actions, and 
judicially determined damages may often employ methods that 
undercompensate for property.184  If, for instance, Zelda needs cash, 
but she receives compensation in the form of a check, the cashing of 
which involves a fee or standing in line in the bank, then a twenty 
dollar damage award will not be an adequate replacement for the 
twenty dollar bill.  Thus, when awarding compensatory damages for 
the loss of property, courts must take account of replacement costs 
and award aggrieved owners incidental and consequential damages. 
The costs to ownership stability engendered by the refusal to 
extend injunctive relief do not constitute the only effect of liability 
rule (i.e., compensatory damage-based) protection.  Liability rules 
may reduce transaction costs where private bargaining is expensive 
relative to litigation.185  Liability rules may also be helpful in 
overcoming strategic obstacles to successful negotiations.186  Thus, 
 
184 There may also be cases where the reserve price is lower than the market price, 
but transaction costs bar the consensual transfer of the property. 
185 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 67.  See also, Louis Kaplow & Steven 
Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. 
L. REV. 713, 719, 726-27 (1996)  (arguing that liability rules should be favored over 
property rules when transaction costs are high because the former minimize 
information costs as opposed to Calabresi and Melamed’s rationale of the 
impossibility of bargaining). 
186 On strategic obstacles to successful bargaining, see Robert Cooter, The Cost of 
Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 23 (1982)  (showing that disagreement as to how to 
divide the contractual surplus is a strategic barrier to successful Coasean 
negotiation).  See also, John Kennan & Robert Wilson, Bargaining with Private 
Information, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 46 (1993)  (theorizing that differences in 
private information are a primary cause of delays in bargaining).  On asymmetric 
   WHAT PROPERTY IS 59 
 
there may be cases where liability rule protection (or pliability rule, 
i.e., variable rule protection187) may be the appropriate policy 
response to threats to property rights.  However, in making the 
determination to turn away from injunctive relief (property rule 
protection), policymakers must take into account the likely disutility 
engendered by diminished ownership stability. 
V. UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY WITH THE VALUE THEORY 
In this Part, we move from the theoretical to the applied and 
demonstrate the explanatory power of the value theory in the law of 
property.  We proceed by showing the value theory’s power to 
explain several broad themes and specific doctrines in the law of 
property. 
A. Possession 
“Possession is nine-tenths of the law” is a maxim familiar to 
every first year law student.188  And indeed, many doctrines of 
property embody this principle by favoring the ownership claims of 
prior possessors.  A classic example is the rule of capture established 
in the chestnut Pierson v. Post.189  There, Pierson was chasing a fox 
on inhabited “wasteland” aided by a pack of hounds.190  Post, “a 
 
information, strategic bargaining, and liability rules, see Robert P. Merges, Of 
Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2659 
(1994)  (observing that in the field of Intellectual Property the valuation problem 
heightens the possibility of strategic bargaining); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 
Do Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining?  A Reply to Ayres and Talley, 105 YALE 
L. J. 221, 223-29 (1995)  (“When each party’s own valuation is not known by the 
other, each party will have incentives to misrepresent its valuation in bargaining, 
hoping to extract more of the bargaining surplus from the other party.  Parties may 
therefore demand too much or offer too little, with the result that efficient bargains 
may not be reached.  In this case, one cannot say unambiguously whether property 
rules or liability rules will be superior.”); See also, Karen Eggleston et al., The 
Design and Interpretation of Contracts:  Why Complexity Matters, 95 NW. U. L. 
REV. 91, 109 (2000)  (defining “asymmetric information” as a situation in which 
“[o]ne party to a contract…has more information about future states of the world 
than does the other party.”). 
187 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
1 (2002). 
188 But see Richard H. Helmholz Wrongful Possession of Chattels: Hornbook Law 
and Case Law, 80 N.W. L. REV. 1221, 1221 (1986) (acknowledging that “[i]t is 
hornbook law that possession of a chattel, even without claim of title, gives the 
possessor a superior right to the chattel against everyone but the true owner,” but 
arguing that the hornbook law is not matched by case law). 
189 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (seminal case awarding property rights in a 
fox to the first possessor despite the practice that the pursuer should be entitled to 
catch the fox). 
190 Id. at 1. 
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saucy interloper,”191 espied the fatigued fox, and swooped in to “kill 
the beast” and seize the carcass.192  The court ruled that Post was the 
true owner, since only he had “occupied” the animal by taking 
physical possession.193  As for the hunter, said the court, “mere 
pursuit” creates no property rights in wild animals.194 
Another example of the primacy of prior possession is provided 
by the rule of find.  The classic rule is that the finder of a lost chattel 
has a paramount right in the found object against every other person, 
save the true owner.  The finder, by dint of having possession of the 
object, has legal recourse against other potential takers.  Thus, for 
example, in Armory v. Delamirie,195 the court decreed a chimney 
sweep’s claim to a found jewel was superior to that of the jeweler to 
whom the chimney brought his find for appraisal.  While the court 
recognized that the chimney sweep was not the “true owner,” it also 
placed his rights as a prior possessor above those of others, including 
the appraising goldsmith who sought to seize the jewel for himself. 
Carol Rose, and subsequently Henry Smith together with such 
collaborators as Thomas Merrill, developed an information-based 
theory to explain the centrality of possession to property law.  These 
scholars analyzed the communicative role of possession in conveying 
information to third parties.  Rose, for instance, explained that 
property doctrines, to function effectively, must take account of the 
intended audience and the symbolic context.196  Thus, in Pierson v. 
Post, for example, the court had to choose between the rule of “hot 
pursuit” that was popular among hunters and the rule of capture that 
was more accessible to a broader audience, extending beyond the 
community of hunters.197  This choice, according to Rose, determines 
which audiences win and which lose.198  Possessory rules, in other 
words, are designed to convey context specific information about the 
rights of duties of competing claimants over assets.  Writing alone,199 
and then with Merrill,200 Smith put a slightly different emphasis on 
the informational role of property.  Smith and Merrill tackled the 
 
191 Id. at 3. 
192 Id. at 3. 
193 Id. at 1. 
194 Id. at 1. 
195 1 Strange 505; 93 E.R. 664 (KB) (1722). 
196 Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin Of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 85. 
197 Pierson, 3 Cai. R. at 10 (Livingston, J., dissenting) 
198 Rose, supra note 196 at 85. 
199 Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1108 (2003) (analyzing the communicative function of proerty 
law vis-a-vis “those under a duty to respect rights and by those wishing to acquire 
rights”).  
200 Merrill & Smith, Numerous Clausus, supra note 4 (justifying the numerus 
clauses principle based on the informational costs imposed by property rights on 
third parties). 
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problem of how property may be protected and transferred efficiently 
in a world of uncertainty regarding ownership and rights.  To them, 
property doctrines including the preference for possessors, are 
designed to convey information efficiently to third parties.201  This is 
important not only in reducing the costs of discovering ownership 
prior to transfer of personal property, but also in reducing evidentiary 
costs should disputes arise about ownership. 
Beyond the informational theorists, however, scholars have had 
great difficulty in explaining the primacy of possession.  Richard 
Epstein, perhaps the foremost proponent of a rule of first possession, 
is surprisingly lukewarm in his normative support for possession in 
the abstract.202  To Epstein, the primary virtue of first possession as a 
rule of ordering property is the fact that it is already dominant, and 
therefore lends property rules stability.  Epstein is less sure that 
possession would provide a good primary rule in property, were it not 
already in use and popular.203 
Even more troubling, informational theorists have not devoted 
much attention to two important caveats to the emphasis on 
possession.  First, rules of possession are subsidiary, not primary.  
That is, rights of owners are preferred to those of possessors, and for 
possession to be important, ownership must be unclear or the owner 
must be, for some reason, unavailable to assert her rights.204  For 
example, while the finder has rights superior to those of subsequent 
takers, the true owner will still prevail over the finder.  Second, the 
 
201 See Smith, The Language of Property, supra note 199 at 1115-1125 (discussing 
the communicative effects of possession).  
202 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Addison C. Harris Lecture (Nov. 9, 2000), in 76 
IND. L.J. 803, 809 (“… an advantage to the first- possession rule that … offsets its 
evident disabilities … [is that it] gives property a single owner.”); Richard A. 
Epstein, Too Pragmatic by Half, 109 YALE L. J. 1639, 1655 (2000) (book review) 
(“The first-possession rule has the virtue of assigning a single owner to a valuable 
asset …[b]ut as with all legal rules, its strengths should not blind us to its 
weaknesses”). 
203 See Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification, and 
Distortion, 2003 U. CHI LEGAL F. 475, 483 (suggesting that early societies adopt the 
rule of first possession by default); Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights Claims of 
Indigenous Populations: The View From the Common Law, Stranahan Lecture (Sep. 
8, 1999), in 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 15 (“I … will happily defend [the first-possession 
rule] … [but] I give equal weight to the rule of prescription, the validity of treaties, 
and the principle of finality.” 
204 See, e.g., Sabariego v. Maverick, 124 U.S. 261, 298-299 (“[P]ossession is always 
presumption of right, and … stands good until other and stronger evidence destroys 
that presumption. … [Until a claim of title by possession has] matured … [it] may 
be removed from one side to the other, toties quoties, until one party or the other has 
shown a possession which cannot be overreached, or puts an end to the doctrine of 
presumptions founded on mere possession by showing a regular legal title ….”) 
(emphasis added).  An important exception to this rule for some kinds of good faith 
purchasers for value is discussed in the next Subsection.  See, infra, Part V.B. 
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modern trend is to deemphasize the primacy of possessors’ rights.  
For instance, modern find statutes require finders to deposit the found 
object with the nearest police station, leaving the finder without any 
rights until the statutory period elapses.205  Both these points 
demonstrate the limited range of possessory rules. 
The value theory provides a better explanation of possessory 
rules, and especially of its limitations and new trends limiting the 
importance of possession.  The value theory explanation also stresses 
the importance of possessory rules in promoting stability, but it adds 
an explanation of why stability is best achieved through limited 
possessory rules.  Moreover, it shows why, notwithstanding the 
informational aspects of possessory rules, an informational theory 
cannot provide a complete explanation for the possessory aspects of 
property law. 
The value theory views possessory rules as oriented, like all 
property rules, toward the protection of value that inheres in the stable 
ownership of an asset.  Possession affects value in two different ways.  
First, property protection is especially valuable for possessors since it 
reduces the cost of acquiring a replacement object; obviously, this 
source of value applies only to possessors.  A non-possessor, by 
contrast, will have to incur transaction costs in order to obtain the 
primary object as well, making replacement a relatively less costly 
affair at the margin.  Second, possession often enhances the subjective 
value that people attach to objects.  The longer one is in possession of 
an object the greater the potential for development of subjective 
value.  This observation is instrumental in Justice Holmes’ 
justification of adverse possession.  Holmes famously argued, “[a] 
thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own for a long time, 
whether property or an opinion, takes root in your being and cannot 
be torn away without your resenting the act and trying to defend 
yourself.”206  Whatever one may think of the strength of the claim 
regarding adverse possession, Holmes’ logic certainly has purchase 
well beyond cases of adverse possession.  The length of possession is 
often positively correlated with the wealth of the possessor’s 
experiences. 
Yet, the value theory also shows why possessory rules must be 
subsidiary to ownership rules.  Since the value of stability in 
ownership would be seriously compromised by permitting current 
possessors to defeat the claims of owners, the law must properly 
assign a lower priority to possessors’ claims.  Moreover, where 
realistic steps can be taken to assist the rights of the prior owner at the 
 
205 E.g., N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 252 (West, 2003). 
206 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 
(1897). 
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expense of those of the possessor, such as by requiring deposit of a 
find at a police station, the law of property should defend the stability 
of ownership, rather than of current possession.  However, where 
prior possessors compete with subsequent takers, and the “true” 
owner is nowhere to be found, the law should favor the prior 
possessor, thereby promoting and defending the value of stable 
ownership. 
Consequently, the value theory provides an alternative 
explanation for many of the possession-related property doctrines 
discussed above.  Consider first the rule of capture.  The value theory 
seeks to protect, first and foremost, the value that results from stable 
ownership.  This value is fully developed only once an asset is 
appropriated and held stably.  While the pursuit of such an object may 
give rise to a portion of this value in the hands of the pursuer, the 
value, naturally, cannot yet be complete.  For the pursuer, the 
marginal replacement cost remains relatively low because while 
obtaining replacements is costly so is the successful completion of the 
pursuit.  Thus, while hot pursuit as a rule of acquisition might just as 
easily serve the purposes of conveying information, it would not serve 
as well as a rule for maximizing the value that inheres in stable 
ownership. 
Similarly, arguing for the importance of possession on the basis 
of the value theory, rather than information or historical accident, 
provides the key to understanding the law of find.  The value theory 
posits that the value of stability of ownership should be protected by 
allowing the owner to prevail against all, and that the prior possessor 
should prevail against subsequent takers in order to protect the value 
of stable possession.  The information theory, by contrast, has some 
trouble establishing why and when current possessors should lose.  
The importance of possession, for information theorists, depends on 
its ability to convey information, and, in the absence of alternative 
information sources (such as registries), there would seem to be little 
reason not to give primacy to the current possessor.  For example, the 
information theory would seem equipped to explain why a finder who 
loses the object should prevail against a subsequent finder.207  Indeed, 
if possession rules are intended to convey to potential transferees of 
the object that they may rely on the title of the possessor without 
costly investigations, the better rule would be to favor the current, 
rather than the former finder.   
 
207 And first finders do typically prevail.  Lawrence v. Buck, 62 Me. 275, 1 (1877) 
(“[Lost] … property belongs to the first finder as against all persons but the loser.”); 
In re Seizure of $82,000 More or Less, 119 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (W.D. Mo., 2000) 
(“[T]he first finder who acquires dominion over the property becomes its owner.”). 
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B. Chain of Title 
A related property concept explained by the value theory of 
property is the notion of chain of title.  Briefly stated, property views 
rights of ownership as being transferred from owner to owner in a 
chain.  A transferee receives only such title as the transferor conveys, 
and, generally, under no circumstances may the transferee receive title 
superior to that owned by the transferor.  Thus, in order to determine 
to what extent any purported owner actually holds title over an asset, 
one must trace the provenance of the title to its “root,” i.e., the 
original owner and grantor in the chain.208 
The chain of title rule is instrumental in maintaining the value of 
stable ownership by ensuring that loss of possession – voluntary or 
involuntary – will not, of itself, endanger the ownership right.  
Consequently, the status and benefits of ownership may be enjoyed 
without excessive investment in the asset’s protection. 
The importance of chain of title is particularly noticeable with 
respect to marketplace transactions between non-owning possessors 
and good faith purchasers.  In much of the world, a good faith 
purchaser obtains good title to personal property bought in a market 
setting, even though the seller did not actually own the object.  Thus, 
for example, in many European countries, a good faith purchaser of a 
painting in an art gallery will obtain good title even though it may 
turn out that the gallery stole the painting from the artist.209  This is 
not the law in the United States.  Here, the general rule of chain of 
title dictates that a purchaser may obtain no more rights than the seller 
has and wishes to convey.210  Only where a seller has “voidable” title 
– meaning that she obtained the object through fraud or mistake,211 or 
where she obtained possession by way of some kinds of owner 
 
208 For practical purposes, the “root of title” in land transaction is generally traced 
back 60 years.  See, e.g., N. J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62-11 (West, 2003); Archer v. 
Saddler, 12 Va. 370 (1808). 
209 See, e.g., Kuopila v. Finland, 33 EUR. CT. H.R. 25 (2001) (reporting that the 
Finnish court below, while convicting the art dealer of conversion, nonetheless 
ordered the painting returned to the good faith purchaser from whom it had been 
confiscated; n.b., the painting turned out to be a forgery); National Employers' 
Mutual General Insurance Association Ltd. Respondent v. Jones Appellant [H.L., 
1990] 1 A.C. 24 (appeal taken from Bridgend County Court) (English courts 
dismissing appeal of decision favoring good faith purchaser of a stolen automobile). 
210 See, e.g., Schrier v. Home Indem. Co. 273 A.2d 248, 250, 251 (D.C. App., 1971) 
(“[A] possessor of stolen goods, no matter how innocently acquired, can never 
convey good title … [because] a sale of such merchandise … does not divest the 
person from whom [the property was] stolen, of title.”). 
211 See, e.g. obiter dicta in O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 867 (N.J., 1980) 
(“N.J.S.A. 12A:2-403(1)… part of the Uniform Commercial Code … does not 
change the basic principle that a mere possessor cannot transfer good title… [but] 
permits a person with voidable title to transfer good title to a good faith purchaser 
for value in certain circumstances). 
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entrusting,212 does the good faith purchaser for value obtain title good 
against everyone in the world, including the original owner. 
For information theorists, these rules are somewhat puzzling.  
Merrill and Smith, for example, suggest that the good faith purchaser 
rules are designed to promote transferability by reducing the buyer’s 
cost of obtaining information about the object’s provenance.  
However, they offer no explanation as to why this interest does not 
compel following the European rule of transferring ownership where 
the item is taken from the owner by theft, for example, rather than 
fraud.  Indeed, Merrill and Smith concede that, under their 
explanation, the good faith purchaser rules in the United States may 
not be ideal.213 
The value theory, however, explains that the common law rules 
regarding “voidable” title protect the stability of ownership unless the 
owner herself manifests that she no longer demands ordinary 
protection of the value she enjoys in her ownership.  For example, 
where the owner parts with her object in exchange for a bad check, 
she has voluntarily relinquished ownership, as far as she knows, for 
what is presumably an agreed-upon price.  Thus, while the law must 
protect her interest in receiving her full payment, there seems little 
reason to emphasize the value of a stable ownership relationship that 
has already been voluntarily sundered.  Indeed, this legal strategy of 
compromising the property rights of the original owner, while leaving 
intact that right to recover in tort for fraud underscores the importance 
of an analysis that focuses on the special value protected by property 
law, while leaving to other legal fields the task of utility-enhancing 
regarding other values. 
As to transferring title to an “entrusted” object, the value theory 
concedes that the rule is based upon an assumption that the rule’s cost 
to the value of stable ownership is less than the potential transaction 
costs that would be engendered by requiring verification of title.  
However, a full explanation of the entrusting rule requires an 
examination of property law’s exclusion rules, which is the subject of 
the next Section.  Thus, we will return to the subject of entrusting 
shortly. 
C. Exclusion 
The right to exclude others from use or entry onto one’s property 
is generally seen as one of the most important rights in property;214 
 
212 See Scrier, 273 A.2d at 250. 
213 Merrill & Smith, Property/Contract Interface, supra note 4 at 840. 
214 See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-180 (1979) (“In this 
case, we hold that the ‘right to exclude,’ so universally held to be a fundamental 
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Merrill215 and others216 have gone further and argued that the right to 
exclude is the defining characteristic of property.  The right to 
exclude spills over into many adjacent fields of law, encompassing 
criminal and tort actions for trespass217 and trespass to chattels,218 
constitutional rights to have one’s property be free of unwarranted 
entry and search,219 and procedural rights to injunctive relief in 
defense of the right to exclude.220  Indeed, so powerful is the notion of 
the right to exclude in property conceptions, that Calabresi and 
Melamed comfortably labeled the injunctive defense of entitlements 
as a property rule.221 
The primary justification for the preeminence of the right to 
exclude is that it indirectly confers upon the property holder the right 
to determine the price for using the property,222 and to “hold out” for 
greater compensation where others seek entry.223  Since compensation 
 
element of the property right, falls within this category of interests that the 
Government cannot take without compensation.”). 
215 Merrill, supra note 180 at 748. 
216 See, e.g., Penner, supra note 11 at 742-743; Richard A. Epstein, Takings, 
Exclusivity and Speech: The Legacy of Pruneyard v. Robins, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 
22 (1997) (“[I]t is difficult to conceive of any property as private if the right to 
exclude is rejected”); but cf. Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty 
after Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REV. 305, 345 (1994) (“the right to exclude has 
traditionally been broader … than justified by the … benefits … [it] secures.”). 
217 See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1067, 1069 
(N.D. Cal. 2000) (“If eBay were a brick and mortar auction house with limited 
seating capacity, …[it] would … be entitled to reserve those seats for potential 
bidders … and to seek … relief against non-customer trespassers ….. [The evidence 
of] BE's ongoing violation of eBay's fundamental property right to exclude others 
from its computer system … support[s] a trespass cause of action.”) (emphasis 
added) (citing Thrifty-Tel v. Bezenek, 46 Cal.App. 4th 1559, 1566, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
468 (1996)). 
218 Id. 
219 U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides: “The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” See 
also, United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1984) ("Searches and seizures 
inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable absent exigent 
circumstances."); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978) ( "[W]arrants are 
generally required to search a person's home or his person unless 'the exigencies of 
the situation' make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless 
search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."). 
220 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (establishing the “exclusionary 
rule” which maintains that evidence obtained through an illegal search is 
inadmissible in court).  
221 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 67 at 1105-1106. 
222 Id. at 1105. 
223 Id. at 1106-1107; Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The 
Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2092-2093 (1997); Merrill & 
Smith, What Happened to Property, supra note 7 at 382.    
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rules generally recognize only losses to market value of the 
property,224 the right to exclude protects the owner’s ability to 
preserve idiosyncratic values, such as her subjective attachment to the 
property.  In other words, the right to exclude defends the owner’s 
ability to extract the full value of the ownership right before departing 
with it.   
The value theory of property thus explains cases like Jacque v. 
Steenberg Homes, Inc., in which the court approved a jury award of 
$100,000 in punitive damages for an intentional trespass on real 
property which caused no actual compensatory damages.225  In 
Jacque, the trespassing Steenberg Homes decided to deliver a mobile 
home to one of the Jacques’ neighbors by plowing a path through the 
Jacques’ snowy field.  Though the Jacques refused permission, 
Steenberg Homes went ahead with the trespass, knowing that the 
regular road was covered by up to seven feet of snow, and contained a 
tricky curve.226  As Keith Hylton explained in defense of the punitive 
damage award, the substantial damage award was warranted by the 
“probable substantial secondary costs resulting from intentional 
invasions of property rights,”227 notwithstanding the absence of any 
direct damages of the kind normally compensated in such cases.  In 
other words, the need to protect the value of stability in ownership 
warranted a large damage award notwithstanding the lack of any 
permanent physical damage to the field.   
Conversely, the value theory of property explains why the right to 
exclude is less vigorously enforced against the “good faith 
improver.”228  Here, the general rule created by “betterment statutes” 
is that where a trespasser improves another’s property in good faith 
and under color of title or a mistaken belief of ownership, the 
encroaching improver may recover the value of the improvements 
from the true owner.229  Courts may also order special remedies such 
as permitting or requiring the true owner to sell the improved part of 
 
224 United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373-374 (1943) (“In an effort … to find 
some practical standard, the courts early adopted, and have retained, the concept of 
market value. The owner has been said to be entitled to the ‘value’, …the ‘market 
value’, and the ‘fair market value’ of what is taken. The term ‘fair’ hardly adds 
anything to the phrase ‘market value’, which denotes what ‘it fairly may be believed 
that a purchaser in fair market conditions would have given’', or, more concisely, 
‘market value fairly determined’.”) (footnotes omitted). 
225 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).  The jury also awarded $1 in nominal damages. 
226 Id. at 157. 
227 See Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 
87 GEO. L. J. 421, 445 (1998).  
228 For a comprehensive description of state rules regarding good faith improvers, 
see Kelvin H. Dickinson, Mistaken Improvers of Real Estate, 64 N.C. L. REV. 37 
(1985). 
229 Alternatively, courts may impose an equitable lien on the improved property, in 
order to avoid liquidity problems for the true owner.  See id. at 45. 
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the property to the trespasser, or even forcing a co-tenancy.  In 
permitting such remedies for the improver, betterment laws go against 
the general trend of enforcing the owner’s right to exclude even in the 
case of such apparently trivial trespasses as in Jacque.   
Yet, there are two important reasons why affording better 
treatment to the good faith improver does not seriously undermine the 
goals of property.  First, since the betterment defense is predicated 
upon an “improvement” or “betterment” of the encroached-upon land, 
one can already be sure that at least the market value of the affected 
property will increase.  While the encroachment may well 
deleteriously affect the non-market value to the owner, including the 
stability of ownership, the increased market value ensures at least a 
partial offset.  Second, the good faith requirement for trespasser 
recovery ensures that the negative effect on stability value will be 
minimized.  Only rarely will a trespasser be able to demonstrate that 
her improvement was the result of a good faith mistake or good faith 
reliance on color of title.  Consequently, the damage to stability value 
can be expected to be quite small.   
By contrast, on the other side of the ledger, assessing harsh 
penalties for the trespass could result in substantial loss to the good 
faith improver.  Given the likely small magnitude of lost value to the 
property owner, the limited circumstances in which the trespass will 
be excused, and the likely great loss engendered by strict enforcement 
of the right to exclude, the value theory posits that injunctive relief—
the standard remedy for violations of the right to exclude—may safely 
be withheld in such cases. 
A similar phenomenon can be seen in the case of “entrusted” 
objects transferred to good faith purchasers.  Again, while disallowing 
the usual owner rights reduces the value of the property, the loss to 
ownership value is likely to be relatively small, and the gain produced 
by allowing the purchaser to prevail is much greater in magnitude.  
Here, the harm produced by strict enforcement of a chain of title 
approach includes a likely large increase in transaction costs since all 
purchasers would have to invest heavily in examining the provenance 
of title.  Conversely, the harm to stable ownership is reduced by the 
factors of the true owner’s voluntarily relinquishment of possession 
by entrusting the object to another’s care, and the limitation of the 
rule to good faith purchasers from a seller that ordinarily sells goods 
of the kind.230 
 
230 U.C.C. § 2-403 (2) (1988) (“Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant 
who deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the 
entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of business.”).  
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D. Co-Tenancies 
Co-tenancies involve a slightly different type of application of 
our property analysis since they generally involve disputes among 
several owners.231  One of the rights generally enjoyed by co-owners 
is the right to partition, allowing the co-owners to end their co-
tenancy, and, thereby, their property partnership.232  Co-tenancies 
may be partitioned in two ways.233  One option is partition by sale; the 
co-owned property is sold on the market, with the proceeds divided 
among co-owners in accordance with their relative shares.  The other 
option is partition in kind.  In such cases, the co-owned asset is itself 
divided among the co-owners in accordance with relative shares.  
Partition in kind often poses practical challenges, requiring careful 
examination of the value of the various components of the co-owned 
assets.234 
Rhetorically, the courts have long exhibited a preference for 
partition in kind.235  This has been manifested in the rule that partition 
in kind will be imposed unless partition in kind is both impracticable 
and will lead to serious prejudice to co-tenants’ interests.  In practice, 
however, courts have often favored tilting the balance toward 
partition by sale, in which the property is sold on the open market and 
the proceeds are distributed among the co-tenants.236  The courts have 
done so by collapsing the two part test for partition in kind into a one 
step examination of whether value would be lost by opting for 
partition in kind.237 
In view of the value theory, the courts have reached precisely the 
right result.  Questions of practicality in the ordinary partition in kind 
test match the issue of ideal asset size noted above.238  As the value 
theory would suggest, in practice the courts determine the question of 
asset size and forced sale by reference to value, rather than to property 
abstractions like Honore’s incidents.  Moreover, even where partition 
by sale is favored, co-tenants may bid for the sold property; thus, 
partition by sale allows a co-tenant who has developed enough of a 
subjective attachment to have become the highest value user to take 
control of the property by submitting the appropriate bid.  Partition in 
kind, by contrast, may result in destruction of value in all those cases 
 
231 We examine the issue of conflicts among property owners again in the context of 
leasholds, infra, Part VII.C. 
232 See, e.g., Delfino v. Vealencis, 181 Conn. 533, 536-537. 
233 Id. 
234 See discussion in Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 
110 YALE L. J. 549 , 616-617 (2001). 
235 Id. at 607. 
236 Id. 
237 See Delfino, 181 Conn. at 543. 
238 Id. at 537. 
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where preservation of value is incompatible with changes in the 
underlying physical nature of the property or its division among many 
users.   
Our analysis has an even greater force when the asset to be 
partitioned is a single movable object or indivisible real property. An 
heirloom dish, for example, will lose its value if it is shattered in order 
to distribute the pieces among its co-owners.239  Similarly, when the 
co-owned asset is the family home partition it may not be partitioned 
in kind. Thus, the de facto practice is fully consistent with our theory. 
VI. REVISING PROPERTY WITH THE VALUE THEORY 
In this part, we discuss various areas of the law that should be 
revised in light of our value theory of property.  As the reader should 
have discerned by now, our analysis favors substance over form.  
Specifically, we seek to do away with the “bundle of sticks” 
characterization and similar lists of property incidents, and focus, 
instead, on the goal of maximizing the value inherent in stable 
ownership.  To this end, we review several of the least coherent 
doctrines of property law, nuisance and takings, and show how they 
may be rendered coherent by analyzing them through the value prism.  
We begin our exposition with the law of nuisance. 
A. Nuisance 
Nuisance doctrine represents an important point of convergence 
between property and torts.  A cause of action for private nuisance 
arises from “negligent or otherwise wrongful activity [that causes] 
unreasonable interference with use and enjoyment of land.”240  The 
first part of the definition draws heavily on the law of torts, while the 
latter relies on property law.  Notwithstanding the relatively 
straightforward definition, nuisance doctrine ranks among the most 
confused areas of property law.  As Dean Prossor famously stated, 
nuisance is “an impenetrable jungle” and a “legal garbage can.”241  
Our goal here is not to recount the various intricacies of nuisance 
doctrine, but rather to show how the doctrine’s narrow focus on the 
incidents of use and enjoyment offers incomplete protection to 
property owners. 
 
239 See Lon F. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 
394 (1978). In the article, Fuller discusses a New York case in which a valuable 
collection of paintings was bequeathed to two museums "in equal shares" and the 
museums could not agree as to how to divide the paintings.  
240 DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 11 at 747 (defining cause of action for 
nuisance). 
241 William Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEX. L. REV. 399, 410 (1942) 
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At first glance, it seems that nuisance law’s protection of the 
owner’s use and enjoyment right is fully consistent with our value 
theory of property.  A closer examination reveals that this is not the 
case.  True, use and enjoyment rights enhance the value of assets for 
owner.  Yet, third parties may unreasonably lower the value of 
property without interfering with use or enjoyment.  Consider, for 
example, the construction of a large industrial plant near a residential 
neighborhood.  While the proximity to the plant may unreasonably 
lower the value of all neighborhood property, it is possible that only a 
small portion of homes will be directly exposed to the smoke emitted 
from the plant stacks—presumably because the stacks are very tall.242  
Under these circumstances, no owner would be able to bring an action 
in nuisance against the plant.  This, despite the fact that the market 
value of the neighboring property has dropped considerably.243  Thus, 
under current nuisance law the plant may effectively destroy the value 
of the remaining houses, since their owners have not suffered 
unreasonable interference with the “use and enjoyment” of property.   
By contrast, a value-oriented jurisprudence of nuisance law 
would recognize the rights of all homeowners to the value of their 
property.  Rather than focus on the effect of the activity on use and 
enjoyment, the value theory would direct the court to examine impact 
on value.  After all, most owners are concerned about the effect of 
various activities by third parties on the value of their property, and 
not on specific incidents. 
B. Takings 
The power of the government to take property through eminent 
domain, and the constitutional requirement that government pay 
whenever it abridges property rights in a manner labeled a “taking” 
are two of the most controversial and puzzling subjects in the law of 
property.  They also apparently send contradictory signals about the 
importance of our value theory.  On the one hand, the government’s 
eminent domain power seems to be completely at odds with our value 
theory of property.  After all, the government’s ability to seize 
property directly undermines the stability of property rights.  On the 
other hand, the limitation of the compensation requirement to “takings 
of property” seems directly to support our argument that the value of 
stability in ownership is a value of itself that warrants special 
protection.  Here, the noteworthy fact is that government actions that 
 
242 We are not suggesting, of course, that all factory activity will necessarily 
constitute a nuisance; rather, we assume unreasonableness for purposes of the 
example. 
243 See generally Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 
VA. L. REV. 271 (2001) (exploring the effect of various land uses on the value of 
adjacent property).  
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adversely affect a person’s wealth are only compensable where they 
burden property244 but not when they do so by non-property means.245 
Yet, we show that there is a place for both these parts of takings 
law in our value theory.  While we do not argue that current takings 
jurisprudence is consistent with our theory—indeed, as many scholars 
have noted there is not much consistency in takings law no matter 
how you look at it246—the takings power poses a much smaller 
challenge to our theory than one might initially think.   
The ability to take by eminent domain is an option of which 
government actors will generally avail themselves where negotiations 
to purchase private property break down.  In such cases, the 
government may take the private property without the owner’s 
consent provided that it does so for public use and in exchange for 
payment of just compensation.  As a “privileged taker,” with the 
power of eminent domain, the government may set aside many of the 
usual protections of private property and transfer ownership to 
itself.247  Scholars explain that this expansive power is necessary since 
the government often engages in large scale projects that require 
coordinated development such as paving roads, building parks, and 
constructing infrastructure.  In all these instances, the government 
must deal with multiple property owners, each of which has an 
effective veto power over the entire project.  For this reason, 
negotiations between the government and property owners may often 
breakdown, as each individual owner would seek to secure rents 
above and beyond her reserve price. 
In Calabresi-Melamedian terms, the eminent domain power 
enables the government to suspend the standard property rule 
protection the owner enjoy and substitute it temporarily for liability 
rule protection.248  With fewer tools to defend her property rights, 
naturally, the property owner enjoys less stability in her ownership, 
and presumably, may extract less of the value.  Importantly, under 
current takings law, just compensation for exercises of eminent 
domain consists of the payment of market value.249  Consequently, it 
may be said that the net effect of government exercises of eminent 
 
244 As we shall discuss presently, the question of exactly what burdens on property 
are considered takings is one of the most insolvable puzzles in the law.  See supra 
note 175. 
245 But see Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the 
Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4. (arguing that the compensation 
requirement of the Takings Clause should apply more broadly to wealth transfers). 
246 See supra note 175. 
247 Cf. Abraham Bell, Private Takings (noting that many public takings are for 
private actors, and urging greater use of a private taking power) (on file with 
authors). 
248 See Bell & Parcho movsky, supra note 187, at 59-60. 
249 See supra note 224. 
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domain is to deprive property owners of that portion of the value they 
have attached to their property that exceeds market price.  This will 
include not only sentimental value, but the stability value that lies, we 
have posited, at the heart of the property system. 
In the lights of the value theory, the power to seize property by 
eminent domain may be justified only if viewed as severely limited by 
the circumstances in which it may be exercised.  And, indeed, in 
practice, eminent domain is quite limited.  Studies have shown that 
the government generally prefers to negotiate a consensual transfer 
with private property owners whose land may become subject to a 
taking.  Given the high cost of eminent domain litigation for the 
government—both in monetary and political terms—the government 
will often choose to secure consensual agreement with affected 
property owners, and avoid being dragged to court.250  Thus, the 
eminent domain power is likely to be invoked only where there is a 
very surplus to be obtained by public ownership of the property, and 
there are significant and costly barriers to successful negotiations.  
Yet, since compensation is restricted to market value, there is a 
significant risk that too much property will be taken from owners with 
rational high reserve prices.251 
 
250 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 
80 (1986). 
251 We presume, as does much of the literature on takings, that government actors 
contemplating takings are influenced by “fiscal illusion,” i.e., they discount costs 
imposed on the public that are not reflected in their own budgets.  The aftermath of 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) provides a cogent 
example in support of this presumption.  In 1988, South Carolina enacted the 
Beachfront Management Act, S.C. Code Ann. § 48-39-250 to-360. (Law. Co-op. 
1990), prohibiting development of certain coastal properties. As a result, David 
Lucas was unable to develop two lots that he had purchased two years earlier for 
$487,500 each. After extended litigation, the Supreme Court upheld Lucas's claim 
that the legislation worked a taking, and that he was therefore entitled to 
compensation.  Faced with a court order to compensate Lucas for the taking, South 
Carolina settled the case by buying the lots from Lucas for $425,000 each and 
paying his legal costs.  The total settlement, costs came to $1.5 million. H. Jane 
Lehman, Case Closed: Settlement Ends Property Rights Lawsuit, CHI. TRIB., July 
25, 1993, at G3.  The state then repealed the preservation statute that had 
occasioned the lawsuit and put the two lots up for sale.  Astonishingly, South 
Carolina rejected an offer from Lucas's former neighbors to purchase one of the lots 
for $315,000 and preserve it undeveloped.  Instead, it sold the lots to a developer for 
$392,500 each. FISCHEL, supra note 11 at 61.  The numbers reveal that the South 
Carolina government was content to require beachfront preservation at a cost of 
$487,500 per lot to Lucas, but not at a cost of $77,500 per lot to itself.  Less 
anecdotally, the empirical data can be said to support the presumption of “fiscal 
illusion.” Id. at 96-97. See also Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal 
Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 569 (1986); Abraham Bell & Gideon 
Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 581 (2000); but cf. Barton H. 
Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1489-1490 n164 (1990). 
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The value theory suggests that higher compensation may be in 
order than that dictated by the ordinary market value standard.  In 
order to ensure that the damages paid more closely resemble the 
actual value of which the owner is deprived,252 owners must be able to 
argue for exemplary damages a la trespass253 in order to recover 
idiosyncratic value, or damages should be raised in order to include a 
penalty reflecting the expected gap between the actual value enjoyed 
by the owner and the lower market value.254 
Closely related to the question of the ideal quantum of 
compensation is the question of what government actions should be 
deemed takings, giving rise to the duty to pay compensation.  While 
straightforward exercises of the power of eminent domain are easily 
identified as takings, other categories of government action are less 
easily classified.  The government may affect property through the 
exercise of many of its powers, giving rise to a category of 
“regulatory takings” which go “too far” in adversely impacting 
property rights while not formally exercising the power of eminent 
domain.255  Additionally, the government may undertake other 
actions, such as improving schools or reducing police protection, that 
will impact positively or negatively upon an individual’s welfare, 
without directly affecting property or invoking the obligation to pay 
compensation for takings. 
While the value theory cannot resolve all the difficulties plaguing 
the perennially puzzling field of regulatory takings, it can point the 
way toward several important insights.  First, the value theory 
explains why there may be particular need to deter government 
actions that reduce wealth by adversely affecting property rights as 
opposed to other government actions that reduce wealth by means of 
 
252 For a discussion of the importance of accurate damage payments in order to 
reduce fiscal illusion of governmental decisions to take property, see Kaplow, supra 
note 251 at 570; Laura H. Burney, Just Compensation and the Condemnation of 
Future Interests: Empirical Evidence of The Failure of Fair Market Value, 1989 B. 
Y. U. L. REV. 798, 795-797 (1989); Michael H. Schill, Intergovernmental Takings 
and Just Compensation: A Question of Federalism, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 829, 889-
890 (1989). 
253 See discussion of Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., supra text corresponding to 
notes 225-227. 
254 Other scholars have suggested amplified damage payments as well.  See Kaplow, 
supra note 251, Burney, supra note 252, and Schill, supra note 252. 
255 The possibility that a regulation may work taking was first recognized by the 
celebrated case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Writing for 
the majority, Justice Holmes famously stated that “while property may be regulated 
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” Id. at 
415. ., David A. Dana & Thomas W. Merrill, Property: Takings 135 (2002) (noting 
that “short of 100 percent loss in value [] the degree of diminution is just one factor 
to be considered [in deciding whether a taking has occurred].”) 
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other mechanisms.  The Fifth Amendment protects property (and only 
property) against governmental takings.  As various scholars have 
noted takings of property are only one way out of many in which the 
government can affect the wealth of its citizenry.256  Various types of 
regulation and taxation impact unequally amongst the different parts 
of the population, and yet, the Fifth Amendment poses no barrier to 
such actions.  Yet, the value theory posits that government actions 
that diminish the value of stability in ownership of property are 
different in kind.  This is because the government’s power to take 
property not only threatens expropriation of the market value of an 
asset; it also reduces the stability of all property, and seizes the non-
market subjective value that inheres in the asset.  Consequently, there 
may be reason to push the government toward acquiring its revenue 
and assets by means that are likely to have this less welfare-reducing 
impact. 
Second, the value theory suggests that of the many different rules 
that have been suggested and used throughout the years to identify 
regulatory takings, the one most suited to property protection may be 
the “undue diminution of value” standard first suggested by Justice 
Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon.257  Indeed, if property is to 
be seen as oriented toward defending value, there seems no better way 
to tell whether property has been unduly hurt by government action 
than to examine the effect on value.258  By contrast, other tests either 
fail to address the core concern of property law, or address impacts on 
traditional “incidents” of property.  Consider, for instance, the 
physical entry test, which views any physical entry on the owner’s 
property as a compensable taking.  While the entry certainly violates 
the right to exclude, the effect on value may be trivial, as in Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,259 where the court ruled that 
forced access to a cable box in an apartment building constituted a 
taking.  This result seems a glorification of form over substance.  A 
different objection may be leveled against the multi-factored balancing 
test introduced in Penn Central v. New York City.260  Penn Central 
creates an ad hoc inquiry that attempts to balance three factors in 
determining whether a regulatory taking has occurred: the owner’s 
reasonable investment-backed expectations, the nature of the 
 
256 See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income 
Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465, 502 n. 121 (1987) 
(citing R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, 297-98 (1985)); Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of 
Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393, 1540 (1991). 
257 260 U.S. 393, 415. 
258 Mahon left open the question of the baseline from which the diminution must be 
measured; we too leave that question for other analyses.  See Bell & Parchomovsky, 
supra note 251 at 552. 
259 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982). 
260 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
   WHAT PROPERTY IS 76 
 
government action, and the degree of diminution in property value.261  
While the focus in value is certainly laudable, neither the nature of the 
government action, nor the investment-backed expectations of the 
owner have much to do with the core concern of property rights – the 
protection of value inhering in stable ownership.  Thus, even were the 
Penn Central test workable, it would make a poor candidate for a 
universal test of regulatory takings according to the value theory.  In 
establishing that a complete destruction of property’s value 
necessarily constitutes a regulatory taking, Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council262 certainly accords with the value theory.  However, it 
is not clear what Lucas adds to the undue diminution test. 
VII. THE BOUNDARIES OF PROPERTY 
Our analysis, thus far, has laid out a theory of property and 
illuminated the contours of property law.  In this Part, we look beyond 
property law to other legal fields, and attempt to provide answers to 
two questions.  First, when should property law bow to the needs of 
other legal fields dealing with assets?  Second, how should property 
react when it comes in conflict with its own imperatives, such as, 
when incompatible property rights clash with one another?  Some of 
these questions have already been partially addressed by our 
discussions of such topics as eminent domain.  We now address these 
questions explicitly by examining several specific examples that are 
typical of situations in which the two questions arise.  
A. Bankruptcy, Mortgages and Sureties 
Property is intimately tied up with the practice of granting 
sureties for indebtedness.  Indeed, in primitive property systems that 
centered property rights on possession, many forms of property 
developed specifically in order to permit systems of pledges, or 
extraction of profit for the provision of credit.263  For example, some 
have argued that leaseholds developed in England in order to provide 
for the taking of interest for loans secured by land.264  Although 
sureties law involves assets and may use some of the same forms that 
are familiar from the law of property, it is clear from our analysis that 
the underlying goals of sureties law differ from those of property.  
 
261 Id. at 124. 
262 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
263 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson & Charles Dia. Thorland, Ancient Land Law: 
Mesopotamia, Egypt, Israel, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 396-398 (1995). 
264 See Roger A. Cunnigham, William B. Stoeback & Dale A. Whitman, The Law of 
Property 80 (2nd Ed., 1993) (stating that leaseholds “seem originally to have been 
designed to avoid the ecclesiastical prohibition on usury in connection with loans.”)   
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Consider a loan from Lender to Debtor of $10,000 secured by a 
pledged automobile.  The aim here is not to enhance value by creating 
a stable ownership relationship between Lender and the automobile.  
Rather, it is to ensure that Lender can extract the market value of the 
automobile in order to satisfy the loan.  Clearly, loan transactions 
often sacrifice some of the value inherent in stable ownership in order 
to increase the likelihood of repayment.  For the lender, maximizing 
the value to be derived from the asset is less important than ensuring 
that such asset value as there is will be used to secure the loan. 
Concretely, the pledging of the automobile in the above example 
is likely to destroy value in several related ways.  It weakens the 
personal attachment of the owner to the vehicle; it transfers 
possession of the car to an arguably less efficient user; and it may 
even diminish what Dan-Cohen labeled ownership value by loosening 
the ownership bond.  For the lender, however, all this value lost is 
irrelevant so long as the remaining value is sufficient to repay the 
debt.  Indeed, since the lender is unlikely to want the pledged asset 
herself, her real interest will be in those asset values that can be 
realized in a market transaction. 
To be sure, the lender will be interested in a stable relationship 
with the asset.  Greater stability ensures greater likelihood of 
repayment.  However, this stable relationship is not one of ownership 
and it does not entail the same value creation of ownership as 
defended by the law of property.   There are instances where the law 
attempts both to ensure repayment and preserve the value of stable 
ownership.  Such an attempt can be found in debtor-in-possession 
schemes in the law of bankruptcy, for example.265  However, these 
attempts are the exception that prove the rule; the difficulty in 
reconciling the two goals of repayment and value through stable 
ownership can be seen in the extreme measures necessary to ensure 
that the debtor-in-possession does not act to the detriment of creditor 
interests.266 
It is against this background that one can understand the 
controversies surrounding mortgages in property law.  Formally, 
when a mortgage is executed by a debtor, the debtor conveys title to 
the underlying property asset to the creditor as security for the loan.  
And, formally, the creditor agrees to reconvey the mortgage and title 
back to the debtor upon the loan’s repayment.  In substance, however, 
the parties intend only to grant the creditor a security interest in the 
property, rather than full title.  As a result, most jurisdictions reject 
the “title theory” which interprets a mortgage transaction in 
 
265 See Thomas G. Kelch, The Phantom Fiduciary: The Debtor in Possession in 
Chapter 11, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 1323 (1992). 
266 Id. at 1350-1351. 
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accordance with their formal meaning.267  Rather, most states now 
treat mortgages in accordance with the “lien theory,” which views 
mortgages as merely conveying a security interest or lien on the 
property, while title remains in the hands of the debtor.268 
How ought the law to deal with an interest denominated as 
property but actually intended as a surety?  The answer, 
unfortunately, very much depends on the context.  Where repayment 
of the loan is likely without levying upon the secured asset, the law 
has a great interest in maintaining the stable ownership value resulting 
from the debtor's property interest.  However, once levying on the 
asset is more likely, this interest is greatly diminished.  Indeed, it is 
highly likely that the ownership relationship will soon be terminated 
in order to allow repayment.  This means that many of the values of 
stable ownership will be greatly reduced in magnitude.  Conversely, 
the value of stability in surety will correspondingly rise.  Accordingly, 
as a debtor edges closer to filing for bankruptcy, the law should 
diminish its protection of debtor's stable ownership and increase the 
protection of the creditor's ability to have the debt repaid.  
Hence, for example, bankruptcy law empowers courts to set aside 
transfers of assets that occurred within one year of the filing date in 
order to improve the creditors' likelihood of recovering the debt.269  
Although generally the law seeks to promote transferability of assets, 
in the case of bankruptcy, there exists a countervailing interest in 
ensuring the stability of the surety by restricting assets.  In bankruptcy 
cases there is a high probability that the asset owner, knowing full 
well that the termination of the ownership relationship is imminent, 
will attempt to transfer her assets not to a higher value user, but, 
rather, to a person who will "shelter" the asset from the creditor and 
return it to the debtor at a later date.  Sanctioning such practices 
would make it more costly for all property owners, including those 
who do not default, to borrow money against their assets, and will, 
therefore, reduce the utility of property owners as a group.    
Much of the ambiguity in secured transactions arises from the 
apparently common perception that the law guarantees stability in 
property law better than it guarantees stability of surety.  Thus, 
creditors will often insist upon clothing a security guarantee with the 
form of a property transfer, in order to enjoy the benefits of property 
law.  This occurs, for example, in “sale and leaseback” arrangements.  
A sale and leaseback involves conveyance by sale of property from 
the seller to the buyer, and then reconveyance by lease of the property 
 
267 DUKEMINIER & KRIER, , supra note 11 at 645 n. 19. 
268 Id. 
269 See discussion in Anthony T. Kronman, The Treatment of Security Interests in 
After-Acquired Property Under the Proposed Bankruptcy Act, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 
110, 110-111 (1975). 
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back from the buyer to the seller.  The result, at least formally, is that 
title passes from seller to buyer, while the seller retains use and 
possession of the asset and pays a leasing fee to the buyer.270  
However, the UCC dictates that the substance, rather than the form, of 
a transaction governs whether it will be viewed as a security 
interest.271  Thus, even where parties purport to sell and then lease 
back an asset, courts following the UCC may disregard the 
conveyance, and view the arrangement as a loan accompanied by 
conveyance of a security interest in the asset, while title stays in 
place.272 
The value theory of property fully endorses this focus on 
substance rather than form.  Under the value theory of property, one 
does not examine a list of “incidents” to determine where a property 
right resides.  Rather, one looks to the party that is designated to enjoy 
the value of the asset, in particular the value of stability in ownership.  
Where it is clear that the purported seller of title is in fact the person 
who will enjoy all the value from the asset unless there is a default of 
payment on the loan, the value theory dictates that the “seller” should 
continue to be viewed as the owner of the property.  Of course, the 
continued attempts by creditors to place themselves under the canopy 
of property law may indicate that bankruptcy and surety laws 
systematically fail to provide sufficient protection for stable surety. 
B. Marital Property 
Like issues of security interests, marital property questions arise 
in endgame situations.  Marital property, in this context, is a term 
used to refer to assets to be divided equitably (or equally) between 
divorcing spouses.273  Our theory suggests that the term “marital 
property” is a misnomer.  The issue facing the court in divorce cases 
is not property ownership; on the contrary, it is usually clear who 
owns the assets to be divided.  For instance, while the state laws of 
property may dictate that only one of the spouses is the sole owner of 
a certain asset – say, a book – the doctrine of equitable (or equal) 
division may still consider the book “marital property” to be divided 
between the spouses.274  Moreover, some potential assets subject to 
division under “marital property” rules are not really property at all.  
 
270 See Thomas C. Homburger & Gregory R. Andre, Real Estate Sale and 
Leaseback Transactions and the Risk of Recharacterization in Bankruptcy 
Proceedings, 24 REAL. PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 95, 95-96. 
271 See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(35), 9-408 (West 2002). 
272 See, e.g., In re Triplex Marine Maintenance, Inc., 258 B.R. 659 (Bankr. E.D. 
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REV. 75, 75.  
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For example, some states consider qualifications recognized by 
professional degrees to be marital property subject to division, 
notwithstanding that they are not property under the ordinary property 
laws of the state. 
Our theory shows not only how, but also why, the definition of 
marital property should diverge from that of ordinary property.  
Property doctrines, as we have said, create and defend value in stable 
ownership.  The doctrine of equitable (or equal) distribution, by 
contrast, aims at achieving a just distribution of existing value.  
Accordingly, the underlying goals of property law and marital 
property law are widely divergent.  Moreover, these goals come into 
conflict in many cases where a court, in order to achieve just division, 
must decree that certain assets be sold at market value or allocated to 
a divorcing spouse who is a lower value user. 
This insight leads to two important consequences.  First, 
distribution laws should cover those assets necessary to achieve a just 
distribution of wealth, irrespective of the suitability of the assets to 
property law.  For example, while a university degree is not a suitable 
candidate for property under our theory,275 it may very well represent 
a source of wealth that is appropriate for equitable or equal 
distribution.  Thus, courts that have attempted to determine whether 
degrees are subject to distribution by examining whether they are 
“property” have approached the question from the wrong 
perspective.276  Second, distribution laws should be applied so as to 
separate, as much as possible, questions of distribution and 
ownership.  In other words, a decision that a just distribution requires 
allocation of the value of a certain asset to one spouse should not lead 
automatically to the conclusion that that spouse should be awarded 
ownership of the asset.  For instance, where a divorcing husband is 
determined to be justly entitled to the value of a family business, that 
should not preclude a decision that ownership should be awarded to 
the divorcing wife.277 
C. Property vs. Property Conflicts: Leaseholds 
Conflicts betwen properties or between owners of properties are 
endemic.  For example, earlier, we considered the tort of nuisance, 
which is designed to curb property uses that unreasonably interfere 
with use and enjoyment of another’s real property.  In our 
 
275 Under the test we developed in part IV.B., supra, the taking of the diploma in 
this case will not deprive the recipient of the value represented by it.  
276 E.g., In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75 (Colo. 1978); Mahoney v. 
Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488 (1982); O’Brien v. O’Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576 (1985). 
277 Of course, such decisions will rely upon having sufficient assets to “reimburse” 
the husband for the business. 
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examination, we focused on the narrow question of whether the tort 
should address loss of value, rather than interference with use and 
enjoyment.278  However, more broadly, nuisance must be seen as 
raising the perennial question of how the law should treat conflicts 
between properties or between owners of those properties.  Similarly, 
property vs. property conflicts may arise in cases of encroachment 
and co-tenancies, which we previously discussed,279 as well as in 
landlord-tenant law, which is the subject of this section. 
Ironically, in property vs. property conflicts, the question of 
protecting the value of stable ownership becomes less pressing, just as 
it does in cases at the boundary of property, such as marital property.  
This is due to the fact that property vs. property conflicts will almost 
certainly end with one owner's stable property interest sacrificed to 
another.  The questions are therefore similar to those raised in the 
context of marital property.  On the one hand, the court has to 
determine ownership, respecting the need to enhance the value that 
inheres in stable ownership.  On the other hand, the court must also 
achieve a property distribution of rights -- this time on the basis of 
efficient allocation of rights rather than justice. 
In landlord-tenant law, the boundary problem of property raised 
by inter-property disputes is particularly acute.  Leaseholds are 
generally recognized as estates in property.  Thus, when a landlord 
rents an apartment to a tenant, the landlord conveys a property interest 
to the tenant by means of a contract -- the lease.  The landlord, of 
course, retains an estate in the realty as well -- the reversion.  Thus, 
conflicts that arise between landlord and tenant may be viewed as 
conflicts between their respective property interests.  In recent years, 
courts have often resolved landlord-tenant disputes by resorting to 
contract law rather than property law.  This is the counterintuitive 
result of a dispute in which both sides have well-defined property 
rights, but diverging interests regarding the enhancement and defense 
of value.  Both landlord and tenant know the duration and scope of 
the leasehold.  However, the interest of the tenant who is granted 
temporary possession of the asset is to maximize the utility she may 
derive from the asset during the duration of the leasehold even if 
doing so is going to diminish the value of the reversion of the 
landlord.  The landlord, conversely, wishes to preserve the maximum 
total value of the reversion property together with revenues received 
as a result of rental of the premises during the period of the leasehold, 
even at the expense of the property’s value during the leasing period. 
Unfortunately, no hard and fast rule may be established for the 
approach to the property vs. property dispute in the context of 
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leaseholds.  On the one hand, because disputes are between landlord 
and tenant, who constitute a closed set of potential contractual parties, 
there is good reason to resort to the classical economic understanding 
of property as simply the set of default rules for contract.  In 
leaseholds, the parties bargain with one another and thus have an 
opportunity to stipulate the terms that will govern their interaction.  
Since the contractual aspects of the relationship dominate the property 
aspects, the application of contract remedies and rules of 
interpretation is more consistent with the expectations of the parties.  
Thus, contract law would provide the best way of resolving disputes 
regarding the leasehold.  On the other hand, it is clear that there is 
considerable value in stable ownership to be enjoyed by both tenant 
and landlord, in particular since tenants will often develop sentimental 
value in the leased premises, while landlords will frequently be better 
suited to extract value (due to specialized knowledge) from their 
premises than anyone else in the market.  These factors mitigate 
toward the application of property law.  Moreover, leasehold disputes 
often must consider efficient allocation of existing property rights 
alongside the protection of value stemming from stable ownership.  
The result is a situation in which neither contract nor property law 
should be seen as complete answers for landlord-tenant issues. 
Yet, the value theory can help resolve some of the issues raised in 
by leaseholds.  Consider, for example, the case of a rental apartment 
that is abandoned by a tenant 3 months into a two-year rental.  A 
contractual approach to the lease would see the abandonment as a 
breach of the rental contract, and require the landlord to mitigate 
damages by attempting to rent the premises to another.  A property 
approach, by contrast, would view the leasehold as having been 
conveyed, and would disallow the landlord’s attempt to retake 
possession without court order dissolving the leasehold property 
interest.  The property approach would require no attempt to mitigate 
damages.  Courts faced with this question have gone both ways, 
although the recent trend is to adopt the contractual approach and 
require mitigation of damages.  The value theory sides with this new 
trend.  Where a tenant has abandoned possession of her leasehold, she 
has manifested just how little value she receives from her ownership 
of the leasehold.  Thus, there seems little need to use the law of 
property to defend the stable ownership value in the leasehold.  
Certainly there is reason to defend the stable ownership value of the 
landlord’s reversion; however, this will not be jeopardized by a 
mitigation of damages rule.  The landlord will know how much value 
he attaches to the reversion, and on that basis will decide whether it is 
worth renting the premises to a new lessee.  The law need only protect 
the landlord’s interest in realizing the benefit of his bargain, which is 
achieved by applying contract law. 
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CONCLUSION 
Our project in this article has been to demonstrate that property 
law is neither an unintelligible “bundle of rights,” nor a mere 
“background condition” that facilitates exchange.  Property, in our 
analysis, is center stage; it is a distinct and vital legal institution of its 
own merits with rules specifically designed to serve its purposes.  We 
have shown that property is best understood as a legal institution 
designed to create and protect the value attendant in stable ownership 
of assets.  The framework we developed in this Article should help 
restore coherence and consistency into property law and scholarship.  
Naturally, the breadth of the subject prevents a comprehensive survey 
addressing every property doctrine or rule.  Yet, the analytical 
approach offered by this Article should assist policymakers and legal 
scholars to make progress on three central property questions: (a) 
which legal relationships come within the scope of property law; (b) 
what is the content of these rights; and (c) how should they be 
protected.  Properly understood, property is a fairly coherent legal 
concept whose centrality in legal thought is completely justified.   
Our analysis also has important normative implications.  The 
value prism should prove useful for courts and legislatures in 
designing new property regimes and revising existing ones.  Not only 
does it point to the core function of property law but it also delineates 
the limits of the field. Moreover, by offering a full account of the 
costs and benefits generated by the institution of property, the Article 
illuminates the tradeoffs involved in the field of property law.  
Naturally, our analysis does not settle every theoretic or practical 
dispute that may arise with respect to property. Yet, by providing a 
common basis for understanding and discussing property, the Article 
may pave the way for novel and insightful scholarly contributions that 
will carry the study of property into the future. 
